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This Article draws attention to a conceptual point that has been overlooked in recent 
discussions about the theoretical foundations of contract law. I argue that, rather than 
enforcing the obligations of promises, contract law concerns complaints against promissory 
wrongs. This conceptual distinction is easy to miss. If one assumes that complaints 
arise whenever an obligation has been violated, then the distinction does not seem 
meaningful. I show, however, that an obligation can be breached without giving rise to 
a valid complaint. This Article illustrates the importance of this conceptual distinction 
by focusing first on the doctrine of substantive unconscionability. I claim that the doctrine 
can be best explained by the way in which a party who engages in exploitative behavior 
may lose her moral standing to complain. It is because such a party has lost her moral 
standing to complain that the law, through unconscionability doctrine, bars her from 
bringing a legal complaint. This explanation avoids the oft-issued charge of paternalism 
and it also offers benefits over an alternative state-oriented account developed recently by 
Seana Shiffrin. Using the conceptual distinction behind this account of unconscionability, 
this Article further argues that recent theoretical debates about the relationship between 
contract law and morality have been largely misconceived. Those debates have focused 
on whether contract law and morality impose parallel obligations. Once one appreciates 
the difference between imposing obligations and recognizing complaints, the comparison 
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looks quite different. Contract law recognizes valid complaints against broken promises, 
much as morality recognizes moral complaints. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The theoretical underpinnings of contract law have been subject to several 
major debates in recent years. Descriptively, there is an ongoing dispute about 
how well the legal institution of contracting tracks the moral institution of 
promisemaking.1 Normatively, there is an ongoing dispute about what values 
we should want and expect the institution of contract law to advance.2 And 
doctrinally, there is an ongoing dispute about how contract law is or is not 
 
1 Compare Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
708, 718-19 (2007) [hereinafter Shiffrin, Divergence] (claiming that contract law fails to hold moral 
agents legally accountable for their promissory obligations), with Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence 
of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 1607-08 (2009) (arguing that contracting cannot 
be understood “without first identifying the theory of self-imposed moral responsibility on which 
[one] take[s] the practice of promise to rest”). 
2 Compare Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 
57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 686 (1986) (advocating for an efficiency-based view of contract law based 
not on “whether the law of damages should deter breach but rather [on] how much deterrence is 
desirable and what remedies induce this optimal amount of deterrence”), with Ernest J. Weinrib, 
Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 57 (2003) (arguing, 
from the perspective of corrective justice, that contract law imposes damages in order to “undo, so 
far as money can, the defendant’s violation of the plaintiff ’s right”). 
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distinguishable from other areas of the law—in particular, torts and property.3 
These disputes are interrelated, but the resolution of each does not necessarily 
hinge on the others. For example, two people might agree that, as a matter of 
fact, contract law tracks morality quite poorly, and yet they might disagree on 
whether this is regrettable or not. Or two people might agree that contract 
law tracks our moral ideas about wrongdoing but disagree about whether this 
means that contract law collapses into tort law. 
Although these disputes take place at a relatively high level of abstraction, 
they hold pervasive and inescapable practical significance. One cannot engage 
with any important topic in contract law without quickly arriving at the question 
of what the institution is designed to do. For example, if one wants to understand 
how the implied duty of good faith applies to noncognized employment 
discrimination, one will naturally want to know how courts conceptualize such a 
duty, whether it be in terms of fairness or economic efficiency.4 Or, if one 
wants to consider the enforceability of electronic terms-of-use agreements, 
one will need to reckon with the role of knowing and voluntary assent in contract 
law.5 Thus, each new and important practical question in contract law inevitably 
draws scholars back into the fundamental theoretical disputes about contract 
law’s underpinnings. And so the debates continue. 
This Article argues that these debates have been afflicted by conceptual 
confusion. Scholars generally inquire about the obligations of contract law. Do 
these obligations line up with the obligations that morality imposes? Should 
our law impose such obligations? Are these obligations similar to or distinct from 
the obligations of tort and property law? I believe these are the wrong questions. 
Contract law, I will argue, concerns the complaints that we have when 
agreements are broken. It is not about imposing obligations. Despite how we 
often talk, contract law does not actually impose an obligation to perform. Rather, 
it addresses whether a party can legitimately complain about having been 
aggrieved by another’s breach. 
 
3 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 773, 774-75 (2001) (describing efforts in different legal regimes to classify rules as grounded 
in contract or in property and noting that “[a]ll this effort at repackaging and relabeling suggests that 
the distinction between property and contract has important legal consequences, but also that there is 
considerable uncertainty about the boundary between the two bodies of law”); Andrew Robertson, 
On the Distinction Between Contract and Tort (arguing that “a sharp distinction cannot be drawn between 
contract and tort”), in THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: CONNECTIONS AND BOUNDARIES 87, 88 (Andrew 
Robertson ed., 2004). 
4 See Emily M.S. Houh, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law: A (Nearly) Empty Vessel?, 
2005 UTAH L. REV. 1, 5-13 (examining various ways of conceptualizing good faith, including the 
“excluder-analysis,” which looks more to fairness, and the “foregone opportunities” approach, which 
looks more to economic efficiency). 
5 See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 464-72 (2006) (describing assent 
as a fundamental principle in contract law and using assent as a lens through which to analyze the 
enforceability of certain electronic agreements). 
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This conceptual distinction can be hard to appreciate. Most people naturally 
assume that whenever someone breaches a contractual obligation, then the other 
party is in a position to complain. Complaint and obligation thus seem to be 
flip sides of the same coin; contractual liability appears to be the mirror image of 
contractual obligation. But careful philosophical examination of these concepts 
reveals that they are not linked as we typically assume.6 I aim to show that, as a 
conceptual matter, it is possible for one party to breach an obligation while the 
other party has no valid complaint against that breach. One way that this happens, 
I suggest, is if a nonbreaching party has lost the moral standing to complain by 
virtue of his or her own misconduct. Complaint and obligation, then, can come 
untethered from one another. 
In order to illustrate this conceptual point, this Article begins by focusing 
on the doctrine of substantive unconscionability. The law typically understands 
substantive unconscionability to work by releasing imprudent bargainers from 
their voluntarily assumed obligations.7 Put this way, one naturally wonders why 
we should so relieve freely acting parties of their obligations. Seana Shiffrin has 
recently argued that the explanation for such a release concerns the state’s interests 
in not facilitating exploitation.8 In contrast, I think that the unconscionability 
doctrine is best understood not as releasing an obligation, but instead as recognizing 
legally that the plaintiff is not in a position to complain. The doctrine reflects the 
idea that a party who takes advantage of wildly unfair terms cannot complain when 
those terms are breached. This account is simple and intuitive, draws on basic 
moral concepts, avoids the oft-issued charge of paternalism, and explains how 
unconscionability coheres with other contract doctrines. If nothing else, this Article 
thus offers a new way to understand the doctrine of substantive unconscionability. 
Unconscionability, though, is just one locus—albeit an especially perspicuous 
one—of a conceptual error that is widespread. Contract law is typically 
characterized as imposing an obligation to perform.9 As a result, debates about 
the nature of contract law are cast in terms of the nature of the obligation to 
 
6 For a discussion of the importance of this kind of conceptual work, see John C.P. Goldberg, 
Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1652-53 (2012). 
7 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 
294 (1975) (criticizing the fact that the unconscionability doctrine would “allow courts to act as roving 
commissions to set aside those agreements whose substantive terms they find objectionable”). 
8 See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 227-28 (2000) [hereinafter Shiffrin, Paternalism] (“[I]t seems then that a 
state’s refusal to enforce an unconscionable contract could reflect an unwillingness to lend its support 
and its force to assist an exploitative contract because it is an unworthy endeavor to support.”). 
9 See, e.g., Hawthorne v. Calef, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 10, 20 (1864) (“The obligation of a contract is 
a duty of performing it recognized and enforced by the laws.”); Stephen A. Smith, The Normativity 
of Private Law, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 238 (2011) (“The law may not punish contract breakers, 
but it is clear that there is a legal duty to perform a contract and that this duty is not fulfilled by 
paying damages.”). 
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perform. But this characterization derives from the assumption that, whether 
courts grant litigants relief or not, they are necessarily deciding questions of 
obligation. It is assumed that one can pursue a complaint in contract law if 
the other party has breached her obligation. As I aim to show, this assumption 
is false: one can be the victim of a breach and yet have no complaint.10 Theorists 
and jurists have overlooked the fact that the breach of an obligation is not sufficient 
to ensure a valid complaint. 
Although the conceptual distinction here is admittedly subtle, when the 
classic debates about the nature of contract law are reframed in light of it, I 
believe that they take on a different character. Gone are questions about the 
obligations of contract law. In their place are questions about what sorts of 
complaints we can level against one another. And, with this reoriented perspective, 
the alleged divergence between contract law and morality dissipates. The 
supposed divergence, it turns out, was built around the idea that contract law 
does not impose the same sort of obligations that are imposed by the morality 
of promises. But this construction misunderstood the function of contract 
law. Contract law is inherently ex post. It is about how we respond to complaints 
after alleged wrongdoing; it is not directly about what we are obligated to do. And, 
ex post, contract law recognizes complaints in much the same way that morality 
recognizes complaints. 
This Article proceeds in an hourglass structure—beginning broadly with 
debates about the nature of contract law, narrowing in to a focal point concerning 
unconscionability, and then broadening back out to the larger debates about contract 
law’s foundations. In this spirit, Part I describes the tension between theories 
of contract law that view it as fundamentally concerned with interpersonal morality 
and theories that view it as fundamentally an institution of the state. The important 
difference is that the former view the basic features of contract law as explicable 
from within morality, whereas the latter view contract law as explained primarily 
from outside morality. Part II focuses on the doctrine of unconscionability. I 
consider two different explanations of the doctrine: the first focuses on the interests 
of the state in having such a doctrine, and the second focuses on the moral standing 
of the complainant. This second explanation draws on the key conceptual distinction 
between obligations and complaints. Part III describes several reasons for preferring 
this second explanation. I believe that the complainant-oriented approach offers 
an intuitively satisfying explanation for the doctrine, gives it a moral foundation, 
and coheres better with existing legal doctrine. This approach also explains the 
parallels between unconscionability and the associated doctrines of duress and 
 
10 Though not the subject of this Article, I also suspect that the opposite conditional—that a 
party can have a complaint in contract law only if there is a breach of an obligation owed to that party—
is similarly false. For some reasons supporting this belief, see generally Nicolas Cornell, The Puzzle of the 
Beneficiary’s Bargain, 90 TUL. L. REV. 75 (2015). 
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fraud. Broadening back out, Part IV uses the conceptual gains from unconscionability 
to suggest a more general approach to thinking about contract law. I argue that 
contract law is inherently ex post and that, as such, it is not concerned with enforcing 
promissory obligations. It is, however, concerned with recognizing promissory 
wrongs, and, in this sense, it is an institution tied deeply to the morality of promising. 
I. TWO THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW 
A persistent topic of modern contract scholarship has been the connection 
between contract law and morality.11 Even as theorists have recently tried to 
cultivate new approaches to contract law, the same questions persist about the 
relationship between contract law and morality.12 Although there are many 
variations, two basic conceptions of this relationship exist. According to one 
view, contract law is essentially a legal structure built around the moral norms 
of promising.13 Thus, contract law necessarily reflects moral norms. According 
to the opposing view, contract law is a state institution with its own purposes.14 
Thus, contract law reflects aims and values outside morality. Or, to put the 
difference another way, one view sees the features of contract law as largely 
understood from within the morality of promising, whereas the opposing 
view sees contract law as explained from outside morality. 
As these descriptions suggest, both views recognize that contract law is a 
state institution distinct from morality—that is, that the legal norms are not the 
same thing as the moral norms. The dispute is over the relationship between 
the two realms: Is it one of dependence and explanation, or not? 
 
11 See, e.g., Kraus, supra note 1, at 1609 (arguing that no “plausible theory of self-imposed moral 
responsibility . . . is consistent with the legal enforcement of all promises, including promises 
intended not to be legally enforceable”); Michael G. Pratt, Contract: Not Promise, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 801, 809-10 (2008) (“[A]t least some contractual undertakings generate nothing like the moral 
obligation to perform that attaches to the making of a binding promise.”); Shiffrin, Divergence, supra 
note 1, at 708 (“[T]he legal norms regulating these promises diverge in substance from the moral 
norms that apply to them.”). See generally DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT (2003) 
(analyzing issues related to the moral underpinnings of contractual obligations, and arguing that law 
can replace existing social institutions); Gregory Klass, Promise Etc., 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 695, 
695-97 (2012) (describing contracts as creating moral obligations that are chosen by the promisemaker). 
12 See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1873, 1896-1907 (2011) (offering a new approach to contract law where “private law is grounded in a 
wronged party’s moral enforcement rights”); Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE 
L.J. 1417, 1420 (2004) (developing a new theory that claims “promises generally, and contracts in 
particular, establish a relation of recognition and respect—and indeed a kind of community—among 
those who participate in them”); Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of 
Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 529, 543 (2011) (discussing the evolution of contract law and 
arguing that “[c]ontractual liability consists of ex ante consent to retaliation in the event of breach—
a retaliation limited and civilized through litigation”). 
13 See infra notes 15–23 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 24–46 and accompanying text. 
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The classic articulation of the view that contract law should be understood 
from within morality is Charles Fried’s 1981 book Contract as Promise.15 The core 
idea is that contracts are binding as the self-imposed obligations of contracting 
parties.16 Contracts, like promises, are the result of voluntary acts performed 
with the intent to place the actor under an obligation. The ability to bind oneself 
in this way—to assume voluntarily an obligation—is itself a form of freedom. 
Other scholars, who differ from Fried on the source of promissory obligations, 
agree with Fried that the rules of contract law are to be understood by reference 
to the source of promissory obligations.17 
The key point here is that contractual obligations arise in the same way 
that promissory obligations arise. Of course, describing why promises are 
morally binding is itself no small task and has generated controversy of its 
own.18 But whatever the explanation for why voluntary promises generate a 
moral obligation, that same explanation can potentially be used to describe 
why contracts create obligations. That is, the moral obligation to keep one’s 
promises can underwrite the legal obligation to fulfill one’s contracts, in the 
sense that one can offer parallel accounts of each. Whatever explains the morality 
of promising, the same justification can explain contract law. Consequently, 
the character of contractual obligations will necessarily reflect the character 
of morality. Breach of contract will be wrong in the way that breaking a promise 
is wrong.19 The success of this view turns on how well moral principles can 
 
15 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2015) (1981). 
16 Id. at 1. 
17 See, e.g., Markovits, supra note 12, at 1448-51 (arguing that contract, like promise, must be 
understood in terms of a community created between promisor and promisee); T. M. Scanlon, 
Promises and Contracts (defending a view of contract law that parallels an account of promising that 
turns on the significance of providing assurance to another), in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: 
NEW ESSAYS 86, 93-99 (Peter Benson ed., 2001). 
18 Fried invokes a conventional account of promising. FRIED, supra note 15, at 11-17. This 
conventional account of promising has been criticized. See, e.g., T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE 
TO EACH OTHER ch. 7 (1998). But the puzzle raised by the unconscionability doctrine that is the 
subject of this Article is no less challenging for Scanlon’s theory. He too thinks that intentionally 
undertaken promises are binding in light of being so formed. What Scanlon adds is the idea that 
promising involves giving assurance. But he does not reject the thought that a binding duty arises 
out of the voluntary making of the promise. Because my concern is with the relationship between 
contract and promise rather than the details of why promises are binding, I have generally attempted 
to avoid the latter topic. For further discussions of this question, see generally WILLIAM VITEK, 
PROMISING (1993); Niko Kolodny & R. Jay Wallace, Promises and Practices Revisited, 31 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 119 (2003). For an account of contract law as reflecting the morality of promising that 
builds on the conception of promises as binding in light of the reliance they induce, see Joseph Raz, 
Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916 (1982) (reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, 
MORALS, AND LAW (1981)). 
19 The view that contract is deeply connected with morality draws some support from recent 
empirical work suggesting that citizens regard at least some breaches of contract as a moral wrong. 
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explain principles of contract law. Accordingly, its proponents seek to demonstrate 
the explanatory fit between morality and various contract doctrines. 
What is largely absent from this description is any reference to the state. 
On this view, my obligation to fulfill a contract is explained by my own voluntary 
action in making the contract, not by some independent requirement imposed 
by the state. And the character of my obligation to fulfill the contract will 
reflect the morality of promises and not a policy choice by the state. 
This is not to deny that contract law is a state institution. Contractual 
obligations are legal obligations and, in that sense, involve the state’s coercive 
power.20 But, on this view, the state’s role is to offer its resources in support 
of the moral practice or in service of the same values that support the moral 
practice. In Joseph Raz’s words, “The purpose of contract law is primarily 
supportive. It recognizes and reinforces the social practice of undertaking 
voluntary obligations.”21 Contract law is a distinct state institution, but one 
that supervenes on the moral institutions. Thus, the particular contours of 
contract law are derived from the morality of promising, not from the public 
policy choices of the state. As Fried puts it, “Since contracts invoke and are 
invoked by promises, it is not surprising that the law came to impose on the 
promises it recognized the same incidents as morality demands.”22 The state 
simply mediates and enforces the already existing relations between citizens. 
By thus assisting citizens in imposing binding obligations on themselves, the 
state fosters the freedom and moral relationships of those citizens.23 
The opposing view holds that contract law systematically diverges from 
morality because it serves different purposes. Contract law is not simply an 
analog of our promissory obligations, but rather a distinct set of obligations 
imposed by the state. Because contract law is conceived of as a public policy, 
its doctrines are viewed as reflecting public policy objectives rather than 
particular moral norms. As Shiffrin puts it, “[B]ecause law is a cooperative 
activity of mutual governance that takes institutional form, its normative 
 
See generally Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach 
of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405 (2009). 
20 See Scanlon, supra note 17, at 99 (elaborating on the differences between promises and legal 
contracts and stating that the latter presuppose a social institution “centrally concerned with what 
is to be done when contracts have not been fulfilled”). 
21 Raz, supra note 18, at 933. 
22 FRIED, supra note 15, at 21. 
23 See id. (“The freedom to bind oneself contractually to a future disposition is an important 
and striking example of this freedom (the freedom to make testamentary dispositions or to make 
whatever present use of one’s effort or goods one desires are other examples), because in a promise 
one is taking responsibility not only for one’s present self but for one’s future self.”). 
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values and principles may well be distinct from, though informed by, those 
comprising interpersonal morality.”24 
Naturally, this view emphasizes a perceived divergence between contract 
doctrine and the principles of morality. If the content of particular contract 
doctrines systematically diverges from the content of morality, then contract 
law must reflect something other than the reasons that morality gives us.25 In 
making this argument, several features of contract law tend to draw attention. 
First and most significantly, contract law gives expectation damages.26 A 
breaching party is normally required to pay the financial value of performance 
to the other party.27 Only in rare instances is specific performance required.28 
That is, contract law generally does not force a breaching party to fulfill its 
contract—it only forces the party to pay the value of the contract to the other 
party. According to commentators, this means that contract law does not truly 
impose a duty not to breach one’s contract, but rather imposes the disjunctive 
duty either to fulfill the promise or pay its value.29 This is thought to be in 
contrast with the moral demands of promising. Morality requires that promisors 
keep their promises. A promisor cannot discharge her moral obligation merely 
by paying the promisee its value. Rather, a promise is, morally speaking, an 
obligation to perform. Thus, whereas morality seems to say that one has a duty 
to keep one’s promises, contract law seems to impose no such duty to fulfill 
one’s contract. As Seana Shiffrin puts it, “The law . . . fails to use its distinctive 
powers and modes of expression to mark the judgment that breach is impermissible 
as opposed to merely subject to a price.”30 Implicit in this argument is the 
well-trodden premise that the remedy offered describes the nature of the right: 
by offering a particular remedy, the law creates a certain form of obligation. 
 
24 Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 1, at 711-12; see also Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Duty and Consequence: 
A Non-conflating Theory of Promise and Contract, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 321, 323 (2006) (“Contracts . . . are 
constructs of a system of law, whereby the state agrees to enforce certain promises entered into in a 
certain form, subject to the limits of the language used in articulating the promise . . . . [T]here is 
nothing moral about the contract versus the underlying promise and . . . the conflation of the two 
is the source of the confusion over the limits of the law of contract. The moral or transcendental 
aspect of the contract is the underlying promise—its soul, so to speak—but the law can only doctor 
its body—what shows in the contract. To me, that is the limit of the law.”). 
25 See Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 1, at 722 (“Contract law would run parallel to morality if 
contract law rendered the same assessments of permissibility and impermissibility as the moral 
perspective, except that it would replace moral permissibility with legal permissibility and it would 
use its distinctive tools and techniques to express and reflect those judgments.” (footnote omitted)). 
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. § 359. 
29 See, e.g., O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) (“The duty 
to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep 
it,—and nothing else.”). 
30 Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 1, at 724. 
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The point here is not only what contract law gives (expectation damages) 
but what it does not give: anything further. Contract law typically does not 
award specific performance. And there are other things that contract law does 
not give: contract law does not provide for punitive damages.31 That is, contract 
law does not provide for additional damages that are based on the perceived 
badness of the behavior. This is unlike tort law, where more egregious conduct 
results in punitive damages reflecting the court’s condemnation of the action.32 
This feature of the law is taken to show that contract law does not treat breach 
of contract as impermissible—as the appropriate target of censure—in the way 
that morality does.33 Moreover, parties generally cannot specify additional 
damages in advance, even if they would like to do so. Thus, whereas morality 
seems to allow parties the freedom to specify certain actions as particularly 
significant and thereby shape their relationship,34 contract law allows no such 
freedom, requiring the value of a contract to be the economic expectations.35 
This is yet another way that contract law does not seem to impose a duty not 
to breach, but only the conditional duty that one pay up if one does breach. 
The idea that expectation damages allow for a breach comes to a particular 
head in the literature on efficient breach. This law and economics idea maintains 
that the law should not discourage breach of contract where the breach would 
be economically efficient.36 Because the promisor may have occasion to gain 
more through breach than the promisee will lose, the theory of efficient breach 
 
31 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Punitive 
damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is 
also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.”). 
32 It is not clear to me whether Shiffrin would accept that tort law is more convergent with 
moral norms, but her argument suggests that view. 
33 See, e.g., Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 1, at 723 (“[I]ntentional promissory breach is not 
subject to punitive damages, that is, to those legal damages that express the judgment that the behavior 
represents a wrong.” (footnote omitted)). 
34 See id. at 726 (“[P]romises occupy an interesting part of moral territory because, through 
them, agents themselves can alter the moral valence of some future conduct. A promise may render 
an action mandatory and important, when it otherwise would have been optional and, perhaps, 
unimportant . . . . Within our moral practices of promising, agents can signify an understanding 
that there is a commitment but that it is fairly loose and flexible . . . .”). 
35 Liquidated damages, for example, are permitted only to the extent that they are a reasonable 
measure of the estimated economic damages ex ante. See U.C.C. § 2-718 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2013) (“Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but 
only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the 
breach . . . .”); cf. Wassenaar v. Panos, 331 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Wis. 1983) (providing that one factor for 
determining the reasonableness of liquidated damages is whether they are “a reasonable forecast of 
the harm caused by the breach”). 
36 See, e.g., Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 
RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970) (“Repudiation of obligations should be encouraged where the 
promisor is able to profit from his default after placing his promisee in as good a position as he 
would have occupied had performance been rendered.”). 
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holds that the best outcome is for the promisor to breach the contract.37 This 
thought explains why expectation damages are an appropriate remedy in contract 
law and why punitive damages are not—expectation damages alone will deter 
inefficient breaches without deterring efficient breaches.38 The theory does 
not view contract law as tracking morality, but rather as promoting economic 
efficiency. In short, the demands of contract are different than the demands 
of morality—and that is a good thing!39 
This does not mean that the second approach—the view that contract is a 
distinct social institution—excludes moral considerations from contract law.40 
Rather, moral considerations enter in a different way—as one set of reasons 
in the calculus of deciding what legal rules to impose. For the second view, the 
role of the judge is not to evaluate a particular act in light of existing moral rules. 
Rather, the role of the judge is to determine what rule will serve the desired 
 
37 Id. 
38 See Richard A. Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 48 
ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 746 (2006) (explaining that the general policy against awarding punitive damages 
is because “many breaches are involuntary rather than willful . . . [and] even deliberate breaches may 
be efficient and therefore socially desirable rather than wrongful”). 
39 This should be qualified by noting that some proponents of efficient breach will not see this 
as a divergence from morality because they will view morality as having the same or a similar structure. 
That is, one might think that it is morally wrong to break a promise only insofar as the costs to the 
promisee are less than the costs of performance to the promisor. See, e.g., W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING 
PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH-CENTURY REFORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW 122 (1996) (“People 
ought not to be liable for punitive damages merely for breaching a contract. They have done nothing 
wrong if they pay full compensation. Indeed, society loses if people do not breach contracts that 
would cost them more to perform than to pay compensation for breaching.”). For example, one 
might think that moral obligation depends on what parties would have agreed upon and that, in 
general, breach will occur in situations where parties would have agreed to allow breach because it 
was economically efficient. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 
439, 452 (2006) (“[B]reach could be immoral or moral. To know which is the case, we have to inspect 
the reasons for breach and the knowledge of the party committing breach.”). Thus, the divergence 
of contract and promise in the economic approach is not conceptually necessary. One might think 
that our moral norms ought to be those that will maximize welfare and that the institutions of 
morality and law are sufficiently close that they produce the same norms. Put another way, one might 
think that there is, or ought to be, a theory of efficient breach in the morality of promises. But in 
such an account, the convergence of contract and promise would ultimately be a contingent feature 
of the similar purposes served by moral norms and legal norms, not any conceptually required 
convergence. The only sense in which the convergence would not be contingent would be insofar as 
the view assumed there is ultimately only one value to be pursued—social welfare—and that this 
explains why contract and promise inevitably converge. 
40 Compare Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 211-12 (1980) (claiming 
that production for others “has no inherent moral value if [the producer] acts with the intention of 
benefiting only himself” because moral value consists solely “in the will or intentions of the actor”), 
with Richard A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 
243, 247-48 (1980) (disagreeing with Dworkin’s characterization of wealth maximization and arguing 
that it can have a moral component). 
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values and then apply that rule to the particular act.41 Morality is only a factor 
informing a rulemaking decision; it does not provide the rules themselves. This 
is the crucial difference. According to one view, contracting already involves acting 
within a certain set of rules—namely, those of morality—and contract law reflects 
these rules. According to the opposing view, contract law is its own institution, the 
rules of which society is free to shape according to what values it sees fit to advance, 
interpersonal morality being simply one among many. 
The arguments catalogued thus far in favor of the second view draw attention 
to particular ways that the norms of contract law require different things of a 
promisor than the norms of morality. In particular, the norms of contract law 
normally require only expectation damages, and therefore seem to diverge from 
morality’s stronger requirement that a promisor be faithful to the promise. 
Morality, unlike the law, requires specific performance, often includes a punitive 
judgment of wrongdoing, and allows parties to modify the appropriate level 
of sanction. 
A parallel argument is available that focuses on contract law’s demands of 
the promisee. Contract law includes a mitigation requirement. When a party 
breaks a contract, the promisee does not get expectation damages if she might 
have avoided those damages by her own actions.42 If you break a contract with 
me, I cannot collect losses that I willingly permit to accumulate. In this sense, 
a party to a contract is expected to take steps to reduce the damages needed to 
compensate her. Morality, however, may not seem to require that a promisee 
mitigate the losses that she will suffer from a broken promise. If you break your 
promise to me, I am under no moral obligation to clean up your mess.43 
In Contract as Promise, Fried defends the mitigation requirement of contract 
law as reflecting an altruistic duty on the part of the promisee.44 This explanation 
has reasonably come in for a fair share of criticism. As Atiyah put it, “Considering 
the otherwise limited role of altruism in the liberal theory of contract, it does 
seem remarkable that one of its chief functions is to shield the promise-breaker 
 
41 See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 29-30 (1955). It seems to me that 
economic analysis views the common law judge as engaged in what Rawls calls “justifying a practice.” 
Id. at 3. In contrast, the opposing approach views the common law judge as engaged in “justifying 
an action falling under” a practice. Id. at 32. 
42 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“[D]amages 
are not recoverable for loss that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or 
humiliation . . . . The injured party is not precluded from re[c]overy . . . to the extent that [h]e has 
made reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to avoid loss.”). 
43 See Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 1, at 725 (“It is morally distasteful to expect the promisee 
to do work that could be done by the promisor when the occasion for the work is the promisor’s own 
wrongdoing.”). 
44 See FRIED, supra note 15, at 131 (“If the victim of a breach can protect himself from its consequences 
he must do so. He has a duty to mitigate damages . . . . This is a duty, a kind of altruistic duty, toward 
one’s contractual partner, the more altruistic that it is directed to a partner in the wrong. But it is a 
duty without cost, since the victim of the breach is never worse off for having mitigated.”). 
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from the full consequences of his wrong.”45 Even if one accepts that the morally 
upstanding promisee would altruistically mitigate the harm caused by the promisor, 
this seems more like an imperfect duty of charity than a strict duty of right. 
Morally speaking, the responsibility for harm seems to fall on the wrongdoer and 
not on the victim who could have done more. But contract law, it would seem, 
has it the other way around. It thus appears to demand more of the promisee 
than morality does. 
Here again, the point is that the norms of contracts and promises are different. 
Any one of the apparent divergences might be explained away, either as a 
problematic feature of contract law that should be abandoned or as an overlooked 
feature of morality. But, according to the view that contract law does not simply 
reflect the morality of promising, the constellation of these differences shows 
that the content of contract law systematically diverges from the content of 
morality. As Shiffrin summarizes, “[C]ontract law expects less of the promisor 
and more of the promisee than morality does.”46 This, then, leads us to the 
second view—that contract law reflects considerations apart from the morality 
of promising. 
It is worth noting that the views I am describing are not entirely rigid and 
without room for intermediate complexity. For example, Richard Craswell 
has argued that philosophical accounts of promising simply lack the precision 
to justify particular legal doctrines concerning remedies and default rules.47 
This position does not reject the idea that contract law may be broadly 
underwritten by moral norms, but it insists that most particular legal doctrines 
must be explained as policy choices rather than as a reflection of moral principles. 
One might say that Craswell’s position allows for reflection of moral norms 
at a broad level, but not at the doctrinal level. 
Somewhat differently, Shiffrin contends that, because their subject matter 
overlaps, it is important that contract law not impose obligations directly opposing 
those imposed by morality.48 While she rejects the idea that contract law reflects 
moral norms, she contends that it should nonetheless accommodate these norms.49 
On this view, contract law does not reflect morality, but neither is it a public 
policy choice made without concern for moral norms. Although I consider both 
 
45 P. S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 124-25 (1986); see also KIMEL, supra note 11, at 109-12 
(discussing Atiyah’s comments). 
46 Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 1, at 719. 
47 Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. 
REV. 489, 503-05 (1989). 
48 See Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 1, at 749 (“Moral agency must be accommodated either 
out of respect for agents’ basic, reasonable interests in leading moral lives, or because a robust culture 
of promissory commitment is necessary for a flourishing political society.”). 
49 See id. at 711-12 (“[B]ecause law is a cooperative activity of mutual governance that takes 
institutional form, its normative values and principles may well be distinct from, though informed 
by, those comprising interpersonal morality.”). 
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Craswell and Shiffrin to be examples of the second view50—the view that contract 
law does not reflect moral principles—they both allow for morality to play an 
important role in shaping contract law.51 
II. TWO THEORIES OF SUBSTANTIVE UNCONSCIONABILITY 
I want to examine these two different views of contract law’s relationship 
to the morality of promising by focusing on the doctrine of substantive 
unconscionability. In this Part, I consider two approaches to explaining this 
seemingly anomalous doctrine—one approach representing the idea that 
contract law involves a policy choice made by the state and the other approach 
representing the idea that the doctrine should be understood as reflecting 
interpersonal morality. 
A. The Doctrine of Substantive Unconscionability 
According to the substantive unconscionability doctrine, a court may refuse 
to enforce a contract if its terms are deemed sufficiently unfair. Consider four 
examples: 
 
• Niemiec v. Kellmark Corp.:52 Defendant was a club that sold membership.53 
Members were then offered retail merchandise at supposedly reduced 
 
50 Dori Kimel also represents a more complicated version of the second view. Although he sees 
contracts as creating voluntary obligations in the mold of promises, he views them as advancing 
different relationships: personal trust versus personal detachment. See KIMEL, supra note 11, at 79 
(“[C]ontract emerges not as promise, but as a substitute for promise.”). 
51 It is also worth noting that the distinction that I am drawing is not perfectly aligned with 
either the distinction between autonomy-based theories and consequentialist theories or the distinction 
between philosophical theories and economic theories. As a matter of correlation, it is probably true 
that philosophers tend to focus more on the rights of particular parties as individuals rather than on 
the broader social welfare impacts of particular legal rules, which are more frequently the concern 
of an economist. But this is not always the case. For example, an economist with a consequentialist 
conception of morality might view contract law as reflecting moral norms, which themselves reflect 
those rules that advance social welfare. Cf. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 4 (2000) 
(“The law is always imposed against a background stream of nonlegal regulation—enforced by gossip, 
disapproval, ostracism, and violence—which itself produces important collective goods.”). Alternatively, 
a nonconsequentialist philosopher might reject the idea that contract law reflects moral principles, 
viewing it instead as one aspect of the political structure accepted in some form of social contract 
and therefore reflecting a political agreement. Cf. Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 1, at 712 (“[L]aw 
must be made compatible with the conditions for moral agency to flourish—both because of the 
intrinsic importance of moral agency to the person and because a just political and legal culture 
depends upon a social culture in which moral agency thrives.”). In short, while it can be easy to slip 
into thinking of the difference between those who view contract as a reflection of morality and those 
who do not as simply a dispute between nonconsequentialist moral philosophers and consequentialist 
economists, this conclusion is not correct and should be resisted. 
52 581 N.Y.S.2d 569 (Tonawanda City Ct. 1992). 
53 Id. at 569. 
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prices.54 Membership dues could not be refunded, even upon the death 
of the member.55 Merchandise could not be returned and orders could 
not be cancelled.56 The plaintiffs bought a membership, but changed 
their minds two days later.57 The court found the membership contract 
was “grossly” unconscionable.58 
• Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.:59 Williams purchased furniture 
from Walker-Thomas Furniture on a monthly payment scheme with 
title remaining in the hands of the store until full payment was made.60 
By the terms of the contract, all payments were credited pro rata on all 
outstanding accounts due.61 The effect of this scheme was to keep a 
balance due on all items until all balances were paid off.62 In 1962, Williams 
bought a stereo set on which she defaulted shortly thereafter.63 The 
furniture company sought to retake all items purchased since 1957.64 The 
appeals court held that the contract was not enforceable because the contract 
contained an “element of unconscionability.”65 
• Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Carter:66 Paragon Homes was a Maine company.67 
It contracted with Carter, a Massachusetts resident, to have work done 
on a home in Massachusetts.68 The terms of the contract, however, gave 
exclusive jurisdiction to Nassau County, New York.69 The only apparent 
reason for this clause was to make litigation costly and difficult for the 
customer.70 The court held the exclusive jurisdiction clause of the contract 
“grossly unfair and unconscionable.”71 
 
54 Id. at 569-70. 
55 Id. at 570. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 570-71. 
59 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
60 Id. at 447. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 449. 
66 288 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 1968). 
67 Id. at 818. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 819. 
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• Glassford v. BrickKicker:72 Plaintiffs contracted to buy a home, contingent 
on a home inspection.73 Defendant provided the home inspection 
services.74 The home inspection contract limited liability to the inspection 
fee paid, which was $285.75 It also required binding arbitration, which 
required an initial arbitration fee of $1350.76 The court found the clauses 
unconscionable because they created a “disingenuous” and “illusory” 
remedy scheme.77 
 
In each of these examples, the contract was not enforced because of the 
grossly unfair nature of its terms. While the unconscionability doctrine is often 
used to invalidate contracts with procedural irregularities—making it simply an 
extension of the law’s protections against fraud and duress—the notion of 
procedural unconscionability is only one part of the doctrine. In the cases above, 
although a slight haze of fraud or duress might be in the air, neither can provide 
the basis for invalidating the contract. The parties formed the contracts in ways 
that are not significantly more problematic than when any ordinary person 
accepts a credit card offer. Conversely, according to substantive unconscionability, 
a contract may be unenforceable based only on the unfairness of its terms.78 
That is, a contract may be unenforceable without any claim that the contract 
was not knowingly and voluntarily accepted by the parties involved. 
One might say that the substantive unconscionability doctrine operates to 
prevent the exploitation of individuals’ voluntary choices. It protects contracting 
parties from agreements that they would not have agreed to had they been fully 
rational.79 This way of putting things has the ring of paternalism—and the 
doctrine has frequently been criticized on precisely that basis. By refusing to 
enforce freely assumed obligations, the courts fail to respect individuals’ freedom 
to determine the course of their own lives.80 The concern is that unconscionability, 
 
72 35 A.3d 1044 (Vt. 2011). 
73 Id. at 1046. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 1046-47. 
77 Id. at 1049, 1054. 
78 See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995) (en banc) (“[A] 
claim of unconscionability can be established with a showing of substantive unconscionability alone, 
especially in cases involving either price-cost disparity or limitation of remedies.”). 
79 For two quite different defenses of unconscionability along these lines, see generally Duncan 
Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory 
Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 624-29 (1982) (appealing to social theory 
concerning unequal power); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003) (appealing to psychological evidence of irrationality). 
80 As Fried puts it, “If we decline to take seriously the assumption of an obligation because we 
do not take seriously the promisor’s conception of the good that led him to assume it, to that extent we do 
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by letting agents out of autonomously created obligations because the courts 
deem such an excuse to be in the agent’s interest, fails to respect the capacity 
of parties to bind themselves.81 
B. A State-Regarding Approach 
One strategy for defending the doctrine of substantive unconscionability 
against the charge of paternalism involves articulating a nonpaternalist basis 
for refusing to enforce the contract. Shiffrin has developed just such an 
argument—that the state need not be motivated by paternalist aims in order 
to substitute its judgment for that of the contracting party. Rather, the state 
may simply be motivated by its own interest in not assisting exploitation. As 
Shiffrin puts it, “[T]he motive may reasonably be a self-regarding concern not to 
facilitate or assist harmful, exploitative, or immoral action. Put metaphorically, 
on moral grounds, the state refuses, for its own sake, to be a codependent.”82 
Thus, the state’s own interests in choosing which agreements to enforce can 
provide a nonpaternalist basis for refusing enforcement. 
Shiffrin’s strategy has two familiar roots. First, the search for nonpaternalist 
justifications as a means for escaping a charge of paternalism is common. This 
 
not take him seriously as a person. We infantilize him, as we do quite properly when we release the 
very young from the consequences of their choices.” FRIED, supra note 15, at 20-21. 
81 There is a further problem that arises for those who believe that the obligations of contract law, 
like the obligations of promises, are self-imposed by the voluntary act of contracting parties. (This has 
been called the “will theory.”) On this view, enforcing voluntarily assumed obligations is a way of respecting 
individual autonomy. See generally, e.g., id. In a nutshell, the will theory creates the following conflict with 
the doctrine of substantive unconscionability: if contract law is based on the morality of promising, and 
promises are binding as voluntarily self-imposed obligations, then contract law should not refuse to enforce 
certain voluntary contracts merely because one party made a poor choice in imposing an obligation on 
herself. While the two naturally run together, the concern about paternalism is distinct from the concern 
about the will theory. The problem of paternalism is that the doctrine of unconscionability seems to restrict 
individuals’ capacity to determine what happens to them out of a concern for their interests—as though 
they cannot themselves be the judge of that. In contrast, the conflict with the will theory arises because 
the will theory holds that a contract should be enforced if it is freely entered into, while the doctrine 
of substantive unconscionability holds that there are some freely entered into contracts that should not be 
enforced. The difference is that the problem of paternalism might be avoided if there were nonpaternalist 
reasons that were sufficient to justify the doctrine of unconscionability. See Peter de Marneffe, Avoiding 
Paternalism, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 68, 69 (2006) (“[T]he government has a general moral obligation to 
recognize and protect against paternalistic interference a sufficiently wide range of important life-shaping 
decisions to ensure that we have adequate control over our lives, enough to achieve genuine autonomy and 
independence . . . . [S]ince some paternalistic policies are compatible with this general obligation, there is 
no compelling reason to think that paternalism is always wrong.”). While such reasons might eliminate 
the problem of paternalism, the conflict with the will theory would persist insofar as the state would 
still be refusing to enforce certain voluntarily entered agreements. One might put the difference another 
way: the prohibition on paternalism demands that certain considerations not be the basis for refusing 
to enforce the contract. The will theory, in contrast, demands that only certain considerations be the basis 
for refusing to enforce the contract. 
82 Shiffrin, Paternalism, supra note 8, at 224. 
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is, for example, the same strategy involved in justifying mandatory seatbelt 
laws on the basis of reducing public healthcare expenditures. The idea is that 
one can justify a seemingly paternalistic policy on the basis of some other 
interest of the state. Second, the appeal to the state’s role as contract enforcer 
is also familiar. This idea is, as Shiffrin acknowledges,83 essentially an application 
of the reasoning used by the Supreme Court to reject racially restrictive 
covenants—that is, agreements not to sell a property to a certain race—in 
Shelley v. Kraemer.84 In that case, the Court held that a court could not enforce 
a racially restrictive covenant because the court itself was prohibited from 
discriminating by the Fourteenth Amendment.85 That is, the enforcement was 
rejected because of the role that the government would have to play, and not 
based on any defect in the covenant itself. Shiffrin’s account of unconscionability 
is analogous: the state will not enforce the contract because it does not want 
to be complicit in the agreed upon action. 
Shiffrin’s strategy relies at least partially on detaching contract law from 
the morality of promises.86 If the question whether the state will choose to 
enforce an agreement is independent of whether the underlying promise was 
morally binding, then questions in contract law are not mere reflections of 
questions in the morality. In this way, Shiffrin’s strategy resonates with what 
I described as the second view about the relationship between contract and 
promise. The unconscionability doctrine can be explained by driving a wedge 
between the state institution of contract and the moral institution of promise, 
and then appealing to state-regarding reasons that are not concerned with the 
interpersonal moral norms at work. 
C. A Complainant-Oriented Approach 
I mean to suggest a quite different defense of the doctrine of substantive 
unconscionability—one that does not rely on a divergence of contract and 
promise or, more generally, law and morality. My claim is that, in cases of 
substantive unconscionability, a promisor may have a freely assumed contractual 
obligation and the promisee may nonetheless lack a valid complaint if the 
promise is broken. This is because acting wrongly towards another party does 
not necessarily imply that the other party has grounds to complain. Thus, 
even if one assumes for the sake of argument the core idea of the will theory—
that voluntarily assumed obligations are binding—the fact that the promisor 
 
83 Id. at 233 n.34. 
84 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
85 Id. at 23. 
86 Notice that this is almost structurally essential to her approach. The search for nonpaternalist 
reasons for not enforcing the contract implies that there must be reasons that do not concern the 
promisor. This implies that the basis for enforcing agreements is not the promisor. 
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acts wrongly in violating her voluntarily assumed duty does not imply that 
the promisor can complain.87 The gap between these two ideas is missed if 
one assumes that obligation and complaint are part of the same moral package. 
In fact, even in morality, obligation and complaint systematically come apart. 
Acting wrongly does not necessarily imply a legitimate complaint for a wrong 
done. Consider an example: You are in a pub discussing sports with some locals. 
Sick of their baseless praise for their preferred team, you casually respond, “Arsenal 
is a bunch of whiners and cheats.” The man at the stool next to you immediately 
lands a right hook to your chin. Suppose that the correct thing to do is to turn 
the other cheek. But you give in to your temptation and retaliate with a swing of 
your own. You have acted wrongly. Your grandmother at the other end of the bar 
has every reason to be appalled by your behavior. But I do not think that the man 
who hit you first can legitimately complain he has been wronged. By striking you, 
he has surrendered any complaint about an analogous injury done to him in response. 
Consider how ridiculous it would sound for him to suddenly say, “You have wronged 
me—I demand your apology for this act of unnecessary violence.”88 
What the example illustrates is that a wrong act may still fail to give rise 
to a legitimate complaint in the other party. The other party loses the position—
the standing89—to complain because of her own misconduct.90 My argument is 
 
87 Shiffrin, for example, writes, “Because her commitment was freely assumed, a breaching promisor 
may be accountable, the proper subject of blame, and perhaps even liable to suitable, proportionate 
enforcement measures at the hands of the promisee and those willing to aid him.” Shiffrin, Paternalism, 
supra note 8, at 222. Shiffrin assumes for the sake of argument that the freely made promise creates 
an obligation for the promisor, and she moves rather freely from this idea to the fact that the promisor 
may be accountable and subject to blame. 
88 For a more literary but brutal example, consider the story of Hermotimus the eunuch, as told 
by Herodotus. Hermotimus, one of Xerxes’s favored guardians, finds the man who castrated him and 
forces him to castrate his children and then be castrated by his children. Hermotimus exclaims, “What 
harm did I, either in my own person or in any of my people, do to you or any of your people, that 
instead of a man you made me into a nothing? You thought that the gods would not notice what you 
did then. You have acted vilely, and they in justice of their laws have brought you into my hands, so 
that you cannot complain of the vengeance that will come to you from me.” HERODOTUS, THE HISTORY 
595 (David Grene trans., 1987). We might agree that the man “cannot complain” about being castrated 
after having inflicted that very fate onto Hermotimus, but we would still conclude it is very wrong. 
89 See G. A. Cohen, Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can’t, Condemn the Terrorists? (“[A] 
person may seek to silence, or to blunt the edge of, a critic’s condemnation . . . . [For example, s]he can 
seek to discredit her critic’s assertion of her standing as a good faith condemner of the relevant action.”), 
in FINDING ONESELF IN THE OTHER 115, 119 (Michael Otsuka ed., 2013); cf. STEPHEN DARWALL, THE 
SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 14 (2006) (“There 
is . . . a general difference between there being normative reasons of whatever weight or priority for us to 
do something—its being what we ought to or must do—and anyone’s having any authority to claim or 
demand that we do it.”). 
90 For an interesting discussion of these sorts of cases, see Saul Smilansky, The Paradox of Moral 
Complaint, 18 UTILITAS 284 (2006). Smilansky argues that morality seems to both insist on the existence 
of a complaint and yet also deny it, creating a paradox. There is only a paradox, however, if one insists that 
all impermissible action is grounds for a complaint—precisely what I am arguing we should abandon 
as unreflective of our moral experience. Smilansky argues that rejecting the connection between obligation 
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that something like this happens in unconscionable contracts. One party loses her 
position to complain when the contract is breached because of her own bad 
conduct before the breach.91 If this is right, then one can accept that a party 
has acted wrongly by voluntarily taking on an obligation and not fulfilling it, 
while also holding that the other party has no complaint based on this breach.92 
For example, in Walker-Thomas, the purchaser may have an obligation to pay up, 
while at the same time the exploitative furniture company may not be in a 
position to complain when the purchaser resists returning all her purchases. In 
BrickKicker, the homebuyers may be doing something wrong by signing an 
agreement to arbitrate and then going straight to court, but the inspection 
company can hardly complain when the homebuyers refuse to pay for a worthless 
remedy. In cases like these, the companies demanding exploitative agreements 
cannot complain when those they are trying to take advantage of refuse to be 
exploited. However, the absence of standing to complain does not necessarily 
imply that there was not an obligation breached. 
In the bar fight example, the party loses his complaint because of his nearly 
identical behavior. The man who punches cannot complain about being punched 
back. In this sense, the complaining party has already disregarded the very norm 
that he seeks to invoke. This seems to open the complaining party to a tu quoque 
criticism. One might point out that unconscionable contracts are not like this. 
The membership club in Niemiec did not breach the contract, so why should 
it be unable to complain about the customers’ breach? 
 
and complaint is unhelpful because “[i]ts systematic rejection, and what this would imply, seems merely 
to change the paradoxicality rather than to solve it.” Id. at 290. I do not share this view because I think the 
concept of obligation is perfectly intelligible without the concept of accountability. 
91 Cf. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
14 (1980) (“Those who deny rights do so at their own peril. This does not mean that efforts to secure 
the fulfillment of the demand constituting a right ought not to observe certain constraints. It does 
mean that those who deny rights can have no complaint when their denial, especially if it is part of 
a systematic pattern of deprivation, is resisted.”). 
92 There are certain similarities between this account and the concept of estoppel. In a case of 
estoppel, a party is prevented from making certain legal claims based on their past actions or assertions. 
See Estoppel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 667 (10th ed. 2014) (“A bar that prevents one from asserting 
a claim or right that contradicts what one has said or done before or what has been legally established 
as true.”). For example, promissory estoppel prevents a party from withdrawing a promise that another 
has reasonably relied upon to his detriment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1981). The idea is that one cannot assert something and then turn around and deny 
it after the other party has relied on it. As a result, promissory estoppel has the appearance of creating a 
contractual obligation where there was none. I am suggesting that one cannot act badly and then turn 
around and complain about the consequential bad action of another. As a result, unconscionability has 
the appearance of eliminating contractual obligation where there was none. In both cases, the legal 
situation changes because one party is prevented (or estopped) from making certain claims. 
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While identical conduct opens the possibility of a tu quoque criticism,93 I 
do not believe that this is the only way that a party can fail to be in a position 
to complain. The same thing occurs, I believe, where the party’s own misconduct 
leads to the other party’s subsequent conduct.94 As G. A. Cohen puts it, “In 
this second type of silencing response you are disabled from condemning me 
not because you are responsible for something similar or worse yourself but 
because you bear at least some responsibility for the very thing that you seek 
to criticize.”95 In other words, where a party’s wrongful action leads to, provokes, 
or is responsible for the subsequent bad act of another, that fact may undermine 
the party’s standing to complain. Distinguishing these ideas, one can see that 
the bar fight example involves an overdetermined lack of position to complain: 
the would-be complainant both did the same thing (tu quoque) and provoked 
the complained-of conduct (different than tu quoque). 
So while the bar fight example involves a party losing his complaint based 
on nearly identical misconduct, this sort of tight similarity is not necessary. An 
appropriate connection (like a causal connection) between different misconduct 
can play the same role.96 For example, suppose you believe that I am a good 
friend. On the basis of this belief, you promise to read a draft of my novel. 
But it turns out that I am not a good friend; my affection has been largely feigned 
for strategic reasons. When you need my assistance, I make no effort to help 
you. It seems to me that, if you break your promise to read my novel, I am 
probably not in a position to complain. One can reach that conclusion while 
leaving open the question whether you should, nevertheless, keep your promise. 
My wrongdoing would prevent me from being in a position to complain, even 
if it is true that you should still keep the promise. 
 
93 The wrong acts would be quite similar if the moral wrong of breaking a promise also consisted in 
it being a form of exploitation. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1017 (2010) (offering empirical evidence that people view breach as a form of exploitation 
of trust). I do not believe that strict similarity is necessary, so I do not pursue this line of argument. 
94 Cohen notes the same distinction in related phenomena:  
Two ways of discrediting a condemning critic’s standing will concern me here. They 
both occur widely in moral discourse . . . . For that first type of would-be discrediting 
response I have three good labels: “look who’s talking,” “pot calling the kettle black,” 
and “tu quoque.”  
For my contrasting second type I have no good vernacular or Latin tag. But I will 
point you in the right direction by reminding you of retorts to criticism like “You made 
me do it,” and “You started it,” even though those phrases don’t cover all the variants 
of the second type. I shall name the second type “You’re involved in it yourself.”  
Cohen, supra note 89, at 121-23. 
95 Id. at 123. 
96 Cf. De Cicco v. Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807, 810 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo, J.) (“The springs of conduct 
are subtle and varied. One who meddles with them must not insist upon too nice a measure of proof 
that the spring which he released was effective to the exclusion of all others.”). 
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In this example, it is no doubt significant that the promise was made under 
nonideal circumstances. Had you known about my bad behavior, you might 
never have made the promise. This is not to say that the promise was conditional. 
It merely acknowledges a relationship between the promise and my bad action. 
My misconduct played a role in inducing your breach. In this respect, the 
example is like a retaliation that is wholly different in kind. In the bar fight, a 
punch is the response to the punch. But the retaliation could have been something 
different. You might have spat at his feet or insulted his appearance. Neither of 
these would have been conduct identical to his, but he still could not complain.97 
What these examples suggest is that inappropriate conduct need not be 
perfectly identical in order for a party to lose her moral standing to complain. 
Where an appropriate relationship exists between the two forms of misconduct, 
a wrongdoer may be unable to complain against the wrongful act of another.98 
Exploiting an opportunity for an imbalanced exchange may be just this 
sort of bad act.99 There is a familiar question about how exploitation is wrong 
insofar as it is not a straightforwardly involuntary exchange. I will not seek to 
answer this question. But the puzzle arises partly because there is a general sense 
that exploitation can constitute a wrong. We do not consider it virtuous to 
“use” or “take advantage of” another. By willfully benefiting from the inability 
of another to negotiate an equitable transaction, one opens oneself to moral 
criticism. While exploitation may not always justify state intervention, its 
morally suspect nature may undermine the position of an exploiter to complain 
against resulting bad acts.100 My suggestion is that when the law refuses to 
enforce an exploitative contract, it is simply tracking this familiar aspect of 
 
97 Of course, if you escalated the conflict, for example by throwing a grenade instead of a 
punch, the other party would be in a position to complain about that. But as long as the response 
was provoked and not disproportionate, it seems like he is in no position to complain. 
98 There is an obvious question about what sort of relationship will produce the resulting loss 
of complaint discussed. I will not try to describe the full contours of this relationship, although I do 
believe there are some evident parameters. Clearly the mere fact that you told a lie once before does 
not mean that you lose your ability to complain if you are lied to in the future. In order for this loss 
to occur, the misconduct must all occur in the course of a unified course of events. The misconduct also 
must be towards the person who subsequently acts wrongly. Finally, the misconduct must be of 
similar or more severe magnitude; one does not lose a complaint for a grievous wrong because of 
some slightly bad act. 
99 See generally ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION (1996). 
100 According to this view, the exploiter may lose his ability to complain because of his poor 
behavior even if he does not himself violate any right of the exploited party. For some accounts of 
the morally wrong aspects of exploitation despite the consent of the exploitee, see generally id. See 
also 4 JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
176 (1990) (“But a little-noticed feature of exploitation is that it can occur in morally unsavory forms 
without harming the exploitee’s interests and, in some cases, despite the exploitee’s fully voluntary 
consent to the exploitative behavior.” (emphasis omitted)); Hillel Steiner, A Liberal Theory of Exploitation, 
94 ETHICS 225, 233-34 (1984) (arguing for a trilateral account of exploitation in which the exploiter 
benefits from injustice to the exploitee by a third party). 
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morality.101 Note that Shiffrin’s strategy similarly relies on the idea that 
unconscionable contracts are exploitative as the basis for the state’s refusal to 
lend its resources to their enforcement.102 The only reason for the state to 
refuse to lend its resources is if there is something wrong with one party taking 
advantage of unfair terms. 
III. ARGUMENTS FOR THE COMPLAINANT-ORIENTED APPROACH 
A. Can One Complain Morally? 
Why prefer one approach over the other? The main difference between the 
two views is whether the moral complaint is available. According to my view, 
the plaintiff in an unconscionability case is not in the position to complain 
morally. The unconscionability doctrine is then explained directly on these 
grounds. In contrast, by appealing to the interests of the state as the basis for 
not enforcing the contract, Shiffrin implicitly assumes that there is a moral 
complaint based on an unconscionable contract. For Shiffrin, the state will 
not enforce the private agreement because of its own self-regarding concerns. 
Shiffrin’s theory would be superfluous if there were not grounds for moral 
complaint, but necessary if there were. I want to offer some considerations that 
 
101 There are parallels between my overall strategy and Henry Smith’s argument that equity 
operates to provide an ex post safety valve to prevent opportunism. See generally Henry E. Smith, 
The Equitable Dimension of Contract, 45 SUFFOLK L. REV. 897 (2012) [hereinafter Smith, Equitable 
Dimension]. I agree with Smith that equitable doctrines suggest the important role that morality plays in 
contract law, and I agree that it is important that the equitable doctrines are ex post. There are, however, 
noteworthy differences. Most important, Smith seems to view the ex post nature of equitable doctrines 
as a contrast to the common law rules—an ex post safety valve to the ordinary set of ex ante rules—
whereas my view is that the entire endeavor of contract law operates ex post. To my mind, even the 
ordinary common law rules operate ex post. Second, Smith’s argument has a somewhat more 
consequentialist bent to it. Smith views opportunism as an evil in part because it shrinks surplus, 
and he views legal doctrines as serving the instrumental purpose of discouraging this evil. For him, 
“[T]he moral and consequential accounts of contract law can agree on much of the content of contract 
law.” Id. at 914. It is not clear to me that the evil that I am focused on—exploitation—necessarily involves 
inefficiency. And I do not believe the use of equitable doctrines is concerned with shaping people’s 
conduct to conform with morality or economic efficiency. 
102 It is the fact that the stronger party is acting wrongly that allows the state to object “on moral 
grounds” and believe that enforcement would “implicate” it. See Shiffrin, Paternalism, supra note 8, 
at 224, 227. Shiffrin’s self-regarding refusal to help is based on the refuser’s unwillingness “to direct 
her energies to facilitating an exploitative relationship, believing it both to be immoral to facilitate 
and an unworthy investment of time and energy.” Id. at 227. At times, Shiffrin backs away from the 
moral language and suggests that the state’s refusal may be based on the fact that “it is an unworthy 
endeavor to support.” Id. at 227-28. It seems to me that “unworthy” must be read in a moral way 
here. The state lends its resources to agreements that may be unworthy in any variety of nonmoral 
ways. Moreover, the only way that unconscionable contracts would seem to be unworthy endeavors 
is insofar as they are wrong to one of the parties. 
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suggest that the promisee is not in a position to complain and that this is the 
justification for the unconscionability doctrine. 
First, note how sanctimonious the exploiting party’s complaint would sound. 
Imagine that party exclaiming, “How dare you?!” Such an exclamation strikes 
us as disingenuous because the party’s own action contributed to that very 
transgression.103 The exploiting party bears some responsibility for the 
violation.104 Within certain bounds, those who have treated others wrongly do 
not seem to be in a position to complain when they find themselves treated 
wrongly in response. Similarly, those who have exploited others with patently 
unfair contracts do not seem to be in a position to complain when the contracts 
are not fulfilled. As I have noted, this is not the same phenomenon as tu quoque, 
but there are strong connections. In both instances, we might say that the 
complaining party should not be heard to say that the act in question was a wrong 
to them.105 
Second, substantive unconscionability contrasts with other cases in which 
the community refuses to lend an agreement its enforcement. If Roxanne and 
John enter into a prostitution contract and then John refuses to pay for services 
rendered, the state will not enforce the contract. This example really is a case 
where the courts simply refuse to give damages even though the party has been 
genuinely wronged in a moral sense. Roxanne has a legitimate moral complaint, 
but the state refuses to recognize a legal complaint based on public policy 
considerations. 
The unconscionable contract is not like this. We do not feel that the exploiting 
party has been done an injustice. In an unconscionable contract, it is not that one 
party truly has a moral complaint and yet the state will not give damages. Rather, 
the exploiter has no complaint at all. Consider, intuitively, the position of the 
 
103 It has the feel of Captain Renault’s exclamation, “I am shocked, shocked to find that gambling 
is going on in here!” followed immediately by the croupier’s, “Your winnings, sir,” in the film Casablanca. 
CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942). 
104 Putting it this way may sound like it is blaming the victim. But here (1) the “victim” has 
done something wrongful, and (2) saying that the “victim” has no standing to complain does not 
condone or absolve the secondary wrongdoer. 
105 The connection with the similar moral phenomenon of tu quoque raises a possible challenge. 
One might think that, if moral phenomena like this are at the root of private law, then tu quoque should 
generally operate as a legal defense, which it does not. I am not deeply troubled by this putative disanalogy. 
For one thing, tu quoque arguments do operate in the law through assorted equitable doctrines like 
estoppel, unclean hands, and so on. See, e.g., Frost v. Carse, 108 A. 642, 643 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 
1919) (“To this [the defendant] might properly reply, Tu quoque, and a court of conscience would leave 
the parties concededly in pari delicto where it finds them.”). For more on this point, see infra subsection 
III.B.3. Additionally, there is a very open question about the scope of the tu quoque phenomenon in morality. 
See generally G. A. Cohen, Ways of Silencing Critics (cataloguing different views of tu quoque’s moral 
scope), in FINDING ONESELF IN THE OTHER, supra note 89, at 134. In light of these two facts, it 
is hard to say that there is a substantial disanalogy. Both the law and morality seem to be responding 
to similar factors. 
2016] A Complainant-Oriented Approach 1155 
furniture company in Walker-Thomas or that of the home inspection company 
in BrickKicker. Unlike stiffed Roxanne, neither had been wronged at all. 
This is why Shiffrin’s proposal seems to miss the mark. The same point 
applies to Shelley v. Kraemer,106 from which Shiffrin’s argument draws. While 
one might say that racially restrictive covenants cannot be enforced by the 
government, this seems to dodge the important issue.107 The more illuminating 
explanation for the unenforceability of racially restrictive covenants—which 
Shelley fails to offer—is that the racist who demands enforcement actually has 
no legitimate complaint that she was wronged. The Shelley strategy implies 
that the landowner does commit a wrong by selling to a black family—just a 
wrong with no remedy. I think that, morally speaking, this cannot be correct. We 
should say that the racist has no moral complaint, not that she has a complaint that 
the government is unable to recognize because it is bound by other commitments. 
Third, Shiffrin’s proposal would suggest that a substantively unconscionable 
contract should not be enforced by a court regardless of which party seeks to 
enforce it. While not a likely case to arise in practice, suppose the exploited 
party were to bring suit against the exploiting party. There is no conceptual 
reason that a party could not insist upon its own exploitation. For example, 
suppose the customers in Paragon Homes were the ones insisting (perhaps entirely 
against their interests) on the exclusive jurisdiction of Nassau County, New York, 
and suppose it were the corporation seeking to waive the clause (perhaps to avoid 
the public appearance of total unfairness towards its customers). In such a 
case, Shiffrin’s account would suggest that the contract would be unenforceable. 
After all, the community would have the same interests in not contributing 
its own resources to exploitation (especially so, given that the exploiter no longer 
wishes to exploit). This strikes me as the wrong result. Whether a court should 
refuse to enforce a clause based on substantive unconscionability should depend 
 
106 334 U.S. 1 (1947). 
107 Part of what makes Shelley such a clever opinion is its use of legal gymnastics. The constitutional 
protections at issue are supposed to apply to state action. Id. at 12-13. The Court applied them in Shelley 
to an apparently private agreement by saying enforcement itself would be state action. Id. at 14. But 
this undermines the distinction between private and state action. It would invalidate any contract the terms 
of which could not have been made as a statute. For example, contracts that restrict speech in various ways 
would be clearly unenforceable. As a result, courts have generally rejected Shelley’s rationale. See generally 
Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 451 (2007). 
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on who is seeking to enforce the clause.108 Contracts are not merely unconscionable; 
they are unconscionable to particular parties.109 
Fourth, if the unconscionability doctrine is about the validity of the complaint 
and not about the self-regarding reasons of the state, then the doctrine would 
apply even where the state’s self-regarding reasons would not prevent enforcing 
the contract. Even if the state generally has self-regarding reasons to avoid assisting 
exploitation, there is no guarantee that such a reason will always justify refusing 
such assistance. For example, Rebecca Stone has argued that appealing to the state’s 
self-regarding reasons not to participate in exploitation may open the state to 
charges of hypocrisy if the state itself should have prevented the background 
injustice that allowed such exploitation.110 Similarly, the state’s self-regarding 
reasons may not seem to justify a refusal if the state sometimes does assist similar 
exploitation and seems to deploy its self-regarding reasons inconsistently.111 
My sense is that even if the state is responsible for the underlying injustice and 
even if it does frequently assist other exploitation, the unconscionability doctrine 
would—and should—still apply. The complainant-oriented approach explains 
this fact because unconscionability is not about the state’s position but about the 
parties’ positions. 
 
108 Courts often describe unconscionability in such party-relative terms, explaining that it allows 
one party (and perhaps implicitly not the other party) to avoid the unconscionable contract terms. 
See, e.g., James River Mgmt. Co. v. Kehoe, No. 3:09cv387, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10106, at *10 (E.D. 
Va. Feb. 5, 2010) (“[T]he . . . provision . . . , albeit unconscionable and unenforceable by the party 
imposing the provision, is voidable by the party upon whom the provision was unconscionably imposed; it 
is not void.” (emphasis added)); Kelley v. Caplice, 23 Kan. 474, 477 (1880) (“Morally, Mrs. C. ought 
to have given [her signature], without making the extortionate demand she did . . . . She thought 
herself in a condition to exact an unconscionable bargain, and for service worth only a few cents she 
demanded and received a written promise for the payment of nearly five hundred dollars . . . . [W]e 
are of opinion that Mrs. C. is only entitled to what may be fairly due her for writing her signature, 
and that she cannot recover on the agreement.” (emphasis added)); Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 
510 (Ohio 1984) (“[W]e find the provisions for maintenance within this agreement to be unconscionable 
as a matter of law and voidable by Mrs. Gross.” (emphasis added)); cf. Mattingly v. Palmer Ridge 
Homes LLC, 238 P.3d 505, 513 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (“We hold that the circumstances surrounding the 
[warranty] agreement’s formation was [sic] procedurally unconscionable and that Palmer Ridge cannot 
enforce the . . . warranty’s limitations against the Mattinglys.”). 
109 One can illustrate the point in terms of a classic joke. The masochist says to the sadist, “Hit 
me, hit me,” and the sadist says, “No.” Now suppose it were a contract dispute. The sadist agrees to 
pay the masochist a dollar for the pleasure of hitting him. He then realizes that the masochist will 
enjoy it and he therefore backs out of the agreement. The agreement does seem substantively 
unconscionable (the masochist could back out on such ground if he were so inclined). But the sadist 
cannot appeal to this unconscionability as an excuse for his breach—he would be saying, “I do not 
owe you a dollar because our agreement was unconscionably sadistic.” Such an agreement is unconscionable 
to the person being punched but not unconscionable to the person paying a dollar. 
110 See generally Rebecca Stone, Unconscionability, Exploitation, and Hypocrisy, 22 J. POL. PHIL. 
27 (2014). 
111 For an example of the concern that the unconscionability doctrine is applied inconsistently, 
see Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 
459 (1995). 
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Finally, even the features of contract law that Shiffrin highlights actually 
point strongly in favor of the complainant-oriented approach. She points to 
the well-known notion that the unconscionability doctrine operates as a shield 
and not a sword: one cannot receive damages for being the victim of an 
unconscionable agreement.112 And she notes that courts focus on the wrongdoing 
of one party rather than the protection of the other party.113 Both these facts 
strongly suggest that the exploiting party loses her ability to complain. The 
unconscionability doctrine operates as a shield because it is a mechanism for 
undermining the complaint of an exploiter. Unconscionability is a way of 
disarming the plaintiff. The courts focus on the wrongdoing of the exploiting 
party because it is this misconduct, not the weakness of the exploited party, 
that causes the loss of the complaint. If the state’s reasons were self-regarding, 
as in Shiffrin’s account, then one would expect courts’ focus to be at least partially 
self-regarding, as it was in Shelley. But the lens of the court in unconscionability 
cases tends to focus squarely on the wrongdoing of the complaining party. 
B. Cohesion with Connected Doctrine 
Aside from its direct appeal, a strength of the complainant-oriented 
approach is its applicability beyond the unconscionability doctrine. A number 
of contexts in which contract law refuses to enforce contracts may be better 
construed in terms of an inability to complain rather than in terms of a lack 
of voluntary agreement. This construction allows us to see unconscionability as 
harmonious and continuous with other contract doctrine and other equitable 
defenses. That is, the complainant-oriented approach seems cohesive with the law 
surrounding unconscionability—in particular, fraud, duress, and unclean hands. 
1. Fraud 
Connections between the doctrine of unconscionability and the more familiar 
ideas of fraud and duress are not uncommon. Many argue that unconscionability 
is a way to protect against subtle cases of fraud and duress. For example, Richard 
Epstein writes, “[T]he unconscionability doctrine protects against fraud, duress 
and incompetence, without demanding specific proof of any of them.”114 This 
assimilation of unconscionability to fraud and duress is thought to make the 
doctrine seem less problematic—it is not a refusal to enforce voluntary agreements, 
but rather a protection against subtle threats to voluntary assent. 
 
112 Shiffrin, Paternalism, supra note 8, at 229. 
113 See id. (“A survey I conducted of many leading unconscionability cases reveals that in nearly 
every successful claim the court focused on the conduct of the stronger party, not the weakness or 
needs of the weaker party.”). 
114 Epstein, supra note 7, at 302. 
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I suggest an opposite assimilation. The best explanation of fraud and duress 
doctrine may—at least some of the time—not be that they render agreements 
involuntary. Instead, it may be that the complainant has forfeited her complaint. 
That is, it is not that voluntary assent of the promisor is undermined, but rather 
that the position of the promisee to complain is undermined. Careful examination 
of the nuances of how these doctrines operate point in this direction. 
Consider the following. Some misrepresentations result in the refusal to 
enforce a contract. But contract law distinguishes fraudulent and nonfraudulent 
misrepresentations leading to a contract. If a misrepresentation is not fraudulent 
(e.g., the person did not know that it was false), then the contract is only void if 
the misrepresentation is shown to be “material.”115 If, however, the misrepresentation 
is fraudulent (that is, known to be false and aimed to induce assent to the contract), 
then the contract is voidable regardless whether the misrepresentation is material.116 
That is, a showing of fraud is enough on its own to invalidate a contract. 
This distinction will appear perplexing to many people. Voluntary assent 
to the contract would appear to be undermined only when a misrepresentation 
is material. If the fraud did not matter to the other party, then it cannot have 
undermined the legitimacy of their assent. But the complainant-oriented 
strategy I suggested for the unconscionability doctrine can explain this: the 
party committing fraud loses her legitimate complaint by virtue of the fraud. 
This is essentially how Williston explains the rule: 
If . . . a party to a bargain has made misrepresentations for the purpose of 
inducing action by the other, and the other party has acted, relying upon the 
misrepresentations, it seems that the former should not be allowed to deny 
that misrepresentations which have effectively served a fraudulent purpose 
were material.117 
That is, the party who commits fraud loses the standing to complain when 
the contract is not fulfilled, whether or not the fraud actually made a difference.118 
 
115 See, e.g., Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. v. A.B. Leach & Co., 159 N.E. 700, 702 (N.Y. 1928). 
116 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“If a party’s 
manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a material misrepresentation by the other party 
upon which the recipient is justified in relying, the contract is voidable by the recipient.”). The requirement 
is a disjunction—either the misrepresentation must be fraudulent or it must be material. See id. cmt. b 
(“[M]ateriality is not essential in the case of a fraudulent misrepresentation.”); see also Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc’y of U.S. v. Phillips, 141 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Ky. Ct. App. 1940) (“The law is definitely 
established in this state in cases of this character by a long line of decisions. The rule is . . . that where a 
misrepresentation is fraudulently made by the insured to procure a policy of insurance the element 
of materiality is unnecessary . . . .”); De Joseph v. Zambelli, 139 A.2d 644, 647 (Pa. 1958) (“Fraud renders 
a transaction voidable even where the misrepresentation is not material . . . .”). 
117 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1490 (1920). 
118 Cf. Epstein, supra note 7, at 298 (“As a moral matter, a person should not profit by his own 
deceit at the expense of his victim . . . . The conduct of the promisee alone is sufficient to allow the 
promisor to repudiate the agreement.”). 
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Contract law refuses to enforce all fraudulent contracts not because nonmaterial 
fraud undermines voluntary consent, but because it undermines the position 
of the defrauding party to complain. 
Note that, in this context, fraud is being used as a defense—as a way to 
defeat a complaint alleging a breach of contract. When fraud is asserted as the 
basis for a legal wrong, as when someone alleges the tort of fraud, materiality is 
a required element.119 Thus, a party may lose her breach of contract claim on 
grounds of having committed fraud even though that party is not liable for 
the legal offense of fraud. This statement sounds paradoxical, but it is not as 
long as one understands that the law will sometimes regard an issue differently 
depending upon the identity of the complainant. A party seeking to assert a 
complaint faces special requirements. One such requirement, I suggest, is having 
the relevant kind of moral standing.120 
2. Duress 
It is a familiar fact that duress may operate as a defense in contract law. 
For example, if someone puts a gun to my head and makes me sign a contract 
giving him $100 (the classic “Your money or your life”), a court will not enforce 
this contract. It is natural to explain this by saying that duress undermines 
voluntary consent. But, as has been frequently observed, matters are more 
complicated than that.121 Suppose that I meet a mugger who says he will kill 
me if I do not give him $100. I know he is speaking the truth; unfortunately, 
I do not have any money on me. Desperate, I offer to sign a contract to give 
him $100 in one week. I genuinely wish to impose upon myself an obligation 
to pay, to make my promise credible to the mugger, such that he will refrain 
from killing me now. In this light, one cannot straightforwardly explain a 
court’s refusal to enforce the contract by asserting that I did not actually will 
 
119 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“Reliance upon 
a fraudulent misrepresentation is not justifiable unless the matter misrepresented is material.”). 
120 This approach may also be part of the explanation why certain defensive misrepresentations—
perhaps including misrepresentations of one’s reservation price—are not considered fraudulent. In 
such cases, the party who would complain of the fraud has induced the misrepresentation through 
metaphoric aggression. See Alan Strudler, Deception Unraveled, 102 J. PHIL. 458, 463-65 (2005) (explicating 
permissible deception in terms of self-defense). 
121 See, e.g., Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 926-27 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, 
J.) (“If you extract a promise by means of a threat, the promise is unenforceable. This is not, as so 
often stated, because such a promise is involuntary, unless ‘involuntary’ is a conclusion rather than 
the description of a mental state. If the threat is ferocious (‘your money or your life’) and believed, 
the victim may be desperately eager to fend it off with a promise.” (citation omitted)); see also Union 
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918) (Holmes, J.) (“It always is for the interest 
of a party under duress to choose the lesser of two evils. But the fact that a choice was made according 
to interest does not exclude duress. It is the characteristic of duress properly so called.”). 
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that I be under an obligation—in fact, I desperately wish to be able to bind 
myself in order to satisfy my attacker.122 
As I have suggested, however, the fact that breach violates one’s voluntarily 
assumed obligations need not imply that the party who is not in breach has a 
legitimate moral complaint. This same idea can be applied to duress. Even if 
I promise to pay $100, my mugger cannot complain if I fail to carry out this 
promise. And this fact is sufficient to explain why a court will not enforce the 
contract. My mugger is in no position to complain. It is worth noting the 
structure of a contract case: it would be my mugger who would file suit against 
me for breach of contract. In refusing to enforce the contract, the court is 
refusing to accept this complaint. This is why, in duress cases, the focus is on 
the severity of the misconduct by the promisee rather than on the level of 
influence exerted over the promisor.123 
In these examples, it may be tempting to think that obligations and complaints 
go hand-in-hand. That is, it might seem that the reason the mugger has no 
complaint is because I do not violate any obligation (which is explained by 
the fact that my supposed obligation was formed under duress). To see the 
difference, it may be helpful to introduce a third party. Suppose the mugger 
demanded not that I pay him, but that I enter a contract with a starving child, 
Charlie. In this contract, I promise to buy Charlie’s fingernail clippings for 
$100. Finding the terms amenable, Charlie readily accepts this agreement. Suppose 
also (1) that Charlie does not have any knowledge of the mugger’s activities, 
and (2) that Charlie lives such an impoverished life that there is nothing he 
can do or forgo that would constitute reliance on my promise (and no one else 
wants his fingernail clippings anyway). Here again, the mugger cannot complain 
if I do not follow through, but it is not as clear that I owe no obligation to Charlie. 
I am inclined to say that I do owe $100 to Charlie but also that the mugger owes 
me reimbursement. Legal systems agree: third-party duress is generally not grounds 
for rescission.124 
 
122 For an excellent discussion of what is actually wrong in such cases of coercion, see generally 
Japa Pallikkathayil, The Possibility of Choice: Three Accounts of the Problem of Coercion, PHILOSOPHERS’ 
IMPRINT, Nov. 2011. 
123 See Selmer, 704 F.2d at 927 (“The fundamental issue in a duress case is . . . not the victim’s 
state of mind but whether the statement that induced the promise is the kind of offer to deal that 
we want to discourage, and hence that we call a ‘threat.’”). Notice the similarity with the economic 
approach here. See supra note 39. But while the economic approach suggests that we create a practice 
of not recognizing such claims, I suggest that morality in fact does not recognize such claims. 
124 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. e, illus. 10 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) (“A, who is not C’s agent, induces B by duress to contract with C to sell land to C. C, in good 
faith, promises B to pay the agreed price. The contract is not voidable by B.”); 7 INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 11, § 459 (Arthur von Mehren ed., 2008) (“[N]o generally 
accepted requirements have emerged for avoiding a contract on the ground of duress by a third party.”). 
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The different treatment of direct duress and third-party duress cannot be 
explained by differences in consent, but it can be readily explained by differences 
in the promisees’ positions to complain. One who places another under duress 
can hardly complain if the elicited promise is not performed. In other words, 
the complainant-oriented approach can explain the law of duress better than 
focusing exclusively on assent and formation. 
3. Unclean Hands 
The complainant-oriented approach bears evident connections to the equitable 
doctrine of unclean hands. Unclean hands operates as a defense when a plaintiff 
has committed some moral or legal wrongdoing in connections with the lawsuit.125 
Here is how the Supreme Court has described the doctrine: 
[W]henever a party who, as actor, seeks to set the judicial machinery in motion 
and obtain some remedy, has violated conscience, or good faith, or other 
equitable principle, in his prior conduct, then the doors of the court will be 
shut against him in limine; the court will refuse to interfere on his behalf, to 
acknowledge his right, or to award him any remedy.126 
In other words, a complainant may lose the entitlement to obtain a remedy based 
on having committed a wrong of his or her own. In this light, it is tempting 
to say that I have been suggesting an explication of unconscionability in terms 
of unclean hands. 
Although unconscionability is similarly complainant-oriented, the analogy 
between unclean hands and unconscionability ought not be drawn too tightly. 
For one thing, unclean hands concerns the complainant’s conduct in a manner 
quite different than does unconscionability. Earlier, I noted the distinction, 
also drawn by Cohen, between two kinds of silencing defenses: tu quoque (i.e., 
“Look who’s talking”) and wrongful provocation or inducement (i.e., “You 
started it”).127 I have been suggesting that unconscionability may be understood 
as an example of the latter. Unclean hands, in contrast, seems to operate along 
the lines of the former.128 Unclean hands may be invoked to prevent a plaintiff 
 
125 See, e.g., Clean Hands Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 306 (10th ed. 2014) (“[A] party 
cannot seek equitable relief or assert an equitable defense if that party has violated an equitable 
principle, such as good faith.”). 
126 Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933) (quoting 1 JOHN NORTON 
POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA § 397 (4th ed. 1918)). 
127 See supra note 94–97 and accompanying text. 
128 See Ori J. Herstein, A Normative Theory of the Clean Hands Defense, 17 LEGAL THEORY 171, 
171 (2011) (noting that both unclean hands and tu quoque “are doctrines of standing that deflate the 
illocutionary force (and not the truth-value) of normative speech acts directed against wrongdoers 
by those guilty of similar or connected wrongdoing”). 
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from exploiting or defrauding some party external to the lawsuit at hand.129 
For example, imagine that a tort plaintiff sues for damages based on lost income, 
but, in the course of proceeding, it is revealed that the plaintiff has evaded 
filing her income taxes in recent years.130 Such a plaintiff, by virtue of her unclean 
hands, may lose her complaint for lost income. This is much closer to tu quoque 
silencing; it is not about the connection between plaintiff and wrongdoing she 
alleges, but about plaintiff’s standing with regard to others, in this case the IRS. 
In this way, unclean hands seems to instantiate a different, though related, loss 
of the moral standing to complain. 
Second, the doctrine of unclean hands has traditionally been limited to 
barring equitable remedies and inapplicable in actions for damages.131 Unclean 
hands evolved as a mechanism to prevent the abuse of unduly powerful equitable 
remedies like injunctive relief and specific performance.132 A party might, for 
example, have been led to provide as security some much more valuable bond 
or real property, and unclean hands served as a mechanism to prevent plaintiffs 
from using equity courts to recover far more than the underlying promissory 
obligation was actually worth.133 In recent years, the doctrine of unclean 
hands has expanded and some courts have begun applying it to bar claims for 
damages.134 For example, the tax evader can lose her claim to tort damages for 
 
129 See, e.g., Manown v. Adams, 598 A.2d 821, 825 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (applying unclean 
hands to enforcement of loans where plaintiff had “defrauded both his wife and his creditors by 
hiding his assets” in defendant’s name), rev’d on other grounds, 615 A.2d 611 (Md. 1992); see also Byron 
v. Clay, 867 F.2d 1049, 1051 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) (“The doctrine of unclean hands, functionally 
rather than moralistically conceived, gives recognition to the fact that equitable decrees may have 
effects on third parties—persons who are not parties to a lawsuit, including taxpayers and members 
of the law-abiding public—and so should not be entered without consideration of those effects.”). 
130 These are roughly the facts of Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 124 F.R.D. 103 (D. Md. 1989). 
131 See, e.g., Universal Builders, Inc. v. Moon Motor Lodge, Inc., 244 A.2d 10, 14 (Pa. 1968) 
(“[A]lthough it has been said that the clean hands doctrine applies in courts of law as well as in 
courts of equity, it generally has been held that the doctrine operates only to deny equitable, and not 
legal, remedies.” (citations omitted)). 
132 See generally Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REV. 
877 (1949). This makes unclean hands possibly a stronger example of Shiffrin’s state-oriented 
justification for denying a remedy. The Supreme Court has described unclean hands as “rooted in 
the historical concept of court of equity as a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the requirements of 
conscience and good faith. This presupposes a refusal on its part to be ‘the abetter of iniquity.’” 
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945) (quoting Bein 
v. Heath, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 228, 247 (1848)). But see Herstein, supra note 128, at 183-91 (criticizing 
the judicial integrity explanation for unclean hands). 
133 See generally Chafee, supra note 132 and cases cited therein. 
134 See generally T. Leigh Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies: An Analysis of Unclean Hands, 99 
KY. L.J. 63, 73-99 (2010) (collecting cases). 
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lost income. Nevertheless, unconscionability has very different origins135 and 
no such traditional limitation.136 
These important differences aside, the doctrine of unclean hands represents 
another way in which the complainant-oriented approach to contract law coheres 
with a wide range of contract law concepts. Unclean hands reflects another 
context in which courts deny legal relief to those who lack moral standing to 
complain. The complainant-oriented approach thus views unconscionability as 
continuous with its equitable brethren137—a continuity that is only strengthened 
by noting the connections between unclean hands and other equitable doctrines 
like estoppel and in pari delicto.138 Thus, again, the complainant-oriented 
approach seems to cohere with other elements of private law. 
IV. THE ALLEGED DIVERGENCE OF CONTRACT AND PROMISE 
I have been emphasizing that a promisor failing in a voluntarily assumed 
obligation and a promisee having a complaint are two distinct phenomena—
two different moral relations. A party may lack a complaint without implying 
that the other party had no obligation. This feature of morality, I have argued, 
can be used to explain various defenses that exist in contract law, beginning 
with unconscionability but also including others like fraud and duress. In fact, 
I believe that distinguishing between one party having a valid complaint and 
the other party having violated an obligation can generally clarify the relationship 
between contract and promise—private law and interpersonal morality. 
A. Contract Law as Complainant Oriented 
What the distinction illuminates, I believe, is the way in which contract law 
is inherently ex post. The focus on whether a complaint exists contrasts with 
morality, where forward-looking obligation is central. Promises create norms 
of permissibility. When I make a promise, I place myself under a moral obligation. 
This is normative. It says that, all else equal, I ought to do what I have said 
that I will do. In this sense, the commitment is action-guiding. 
 
135 See generally Alexander J. Black, Undue Influence and Unconscionability in Contracts and the 
Equitable Remedy of Rescission in Canada, 17 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 47 (2011) (discussing 
the origins of unconscionability in undue influence). 
136 As shown supra Section II.A, unconscionability may be used to avoid any suit for breach of 
contract, even for damages. 
137 Cf. generally Smith, Equitable Dimension, supra note 101. 
138 T. Leigh Anenson, Beyond Chafee: A Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands, 47 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 509, 566-73 (2010) (describing the connections between unclean hands and others equitable 
doctrines). For more on estoppel, see supra note 92. “In pari delicto” describes cases in which a court 
denies any remedy because it deems both parties to be equally at fault. See In Pari Delicto, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 911 (10th ed. 2014). 
1164 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 1131 
In contrast, I do not believe that contract law creates norms of legal 
permissibility that are analogous to norms of moral permissibility. This is 
because contract law does not create norms of permissibility at all. It is simply 
not about that. In general, contract law provides a legal remedy to those who 
have complaints arising out of broken agreements. It is purely retrospective; 
it concerns the relations that occur once something impermissible is done.139 
What it does not do is impose norms of permissibility.140 Contract law is thus 
unlike criminal law—at least under a conception according to which criminal 
law prohibits certain actions. In particular, contract law does not always say 
whether you should or should not fulfill your side of any given agreement.141 
What it determines is whether or not the other party has a complaint if you 
do not.142 As the examples already considered illustrate, these two questions 
can come apart, and when they do, contract law addresses the second question.143 
 
139 This view is shared with a civil recourse conception of contract law and private law generally. 
See Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA 
L. REV. 529, 543 (2011) (“Contractual liability consists of ex ante consent to retaliation in the event 
of breach—a retaliation limited and civilized through litigation.”); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil 
Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 735-38 (2003) [hereinafter Zipursky, Civil Recourse] 
(arguing that the right to compensation through tort law is based on the law’s creation of a new right 
against the perpetrator, not based on the perpetrator’s duty to repair the damage done). The civil 
recourse approach similarly focuses on the essentially ex post nature of contractual liability. In my 
view, however, the civil recourse theories go too far in severing the connection between the underlying 
obligation and the remedy. I agree with the shift away from corrective justice accounts, according to 
which the remedy essentially involves the restoration of the right. But by severing this connection, 
the civil recourse approach seems unable to adequately connect the right to damages with the underlying 
violation. In some ways, I view the approach that I am describing as a compromise between corrective 
justice theories and civil recourse theories. 
140 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“The traditional goal of the law of contract remedies has not been compulsion of the promisor to 
perform his promise but compensation of the promisee for the loss resulting from breach.”). 
141 Of course, often contract law will have to determine whether you should or should not fulfill 
your promise. I have emphasized doctrines that direct the court’s focus away from that question. But many, 
probably most, contract cases will involve deciding whether there was a breach of obligation. My 
claim is simply that such a determination is not the focal point of contract law. 
142 For further evidence of this claim drawing on rules about third-party beneficiaries, see 
Cornell, supra note 10, at 117-23 (arguing that third-party beneficiaries’ standing to complain cannot 
be understood in terms of their being owed a contract duty, and that this point may generalize to all 
contract plaintiffs). 
143 But cf. generally Barbara H. Fried, The Limits of a Nonconsequentialist Approach to Torts, 18 
LEGAL THEORY 231 (2012). Barbara Fried forcefully argues that thinking one can answer the “compensation 
question” without also answering the “prohibition question” is a major mistake in philosophical approaches 
to private law. E.g., id. at 239. As a criticism of many corrective justice approaches, which attach the 
ex post question of compensation to the ex ante questions about rights, I think Fried’s argument has 
some merit. But, unlike Fried or even the corrective justice theorists, I do not believe that private 
law includes a “prohibition question,” except insofar as it must indirectly decide what counts as morally 
prohibited conduct. 
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One might think that this characterization, if correct, shows that contract 
law and the morality of promising are fundamentally divergent after all. Morality 
is normative and action guiding; contract law is retrospective and remedial.144 
But this is not correct, because morality also has its own retrospective and 
remedial side. Just as you might have a legal complaint, so too might you have 
a moral complaint. If I violate a moral obligation owed to you, then you may 
rightfully feel aggrieved. You may complain against my action, asserting your 
resentment or demanding an apology. The moral wrong might make it appropriate 
for me to take remedial steps, from merely apologizing to actually giving 
compensation. In other words, morality comes with a whole package of ex post 
and remedial concepts, practices, and relationships. 
The question whether contract law is based on the morality of promising 
should be focused on whether the rules of contract law can be understood in 
terms of the moral practices surrounding promissory wrongs and complaints. 
To compare as sources of norms contract law, in its ex post and remedial form, 
with the morality of promises is to compare apples with oranges.145 
 
144 A somewhat related idea is at work in Pratt, supra note 11, at 809-10 (“The objection to the 
claim that contracts are promises . . . exploits the fact that at least some contractual undertakings 
generate nothing like the moral obligation to perform that attaches to the making of a binding promise.”). 
Pratt’s argument depends on the idea that one can make a contract without binding oneself morally 
to perform. See, e.g., id. at 809 (“But if promises are undertakings to which certain definite moral norms 
attach, including a requirement that they be performed, then contracts are not promises . . . .”). Pratt 
is wrong to think that this means that there can be contracts without promises. It shows only that 
some promises are promises to pay damages if one does not perform rather than promises to perform. 
But it is revealing that Pratt conflates contracting with conditionally agreeing to pay damages. See 
id. at 807-08 (describing a supposed case of contracting without promising in which one party “said 
that he would fully guarantee his work by contract”). This mistake is plausible precisely because 
contract law is fundamentally about the remedial question—i.e., the complaint. In a different way, 
the conception of promises as normative and contract as purely remedial also seems to motivate Lipshaw, 
supra note 24, who argues that promise and contract are separate because the former concerns obligations 
and the latter concerns consequences. Unlike Pratt, Lipshaw does not maintain that there could be 
contracts without promises, but he insists that contract law is not addressed to the moral question of 
obligation. Id. at 327. While I am in agreement with this latter point, I do not think it follows that 
contract law is not based on morality, because I believe morality concerns relationships other than 
that of obligation. 
145 Other defenders of the relationship between contract and promise have emphasized this 
point, albeit in slightly different ways. For example, Jody Kraus argues that autonomy should mean 
that contracting parties are able to select not only their duties but also their remedies and that, as a 
result, the important question is whether contractual remedies correspond with remedial moral 
rights. See Kraus, supra note 1, at 1610 (“By insisting that the justification of contractual remedies turns on 
their correspondence to promissory morality, correspondence theories force the question of how morality 
determines the content of remedial moral rights and duties generally.”). I am very sympathetic to Kraus’s 
idea that correspondence theories have focused on the wrong comparison. I am less sympathetic to the idea 
that this is because contracting parties can uniquely choose their remedial rights and obligations. For one 
thing, this creates an obvious regress problem. What are the remedies for a violation of the remedial rights? 
At some point, they cannot have been chosen. Moreover, the gap between the obligation owed and what 
can be demanded may exist just as much outside of promissory or contractual obligations as within them. 
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I believe that, when the comparison is properly made, the parallels are strong. 
When and to what extent a person has a complaint in contract law largely tracks 
when and to what extent a person has a moral complaint. In this way, I believe 
it is correct that contract law is best understood from within the morality of promising. 
B. The Alleged Divergence 
To develop this comparison, I want to return to the areas of contract law 
where others have found a divergence between contract and promise. First 
and most important, those who view contract law as an institution best understood 
in terms of state policy objectives rather than in terms of morality tend to 
focus on expectation damages. The divergence view argues that because contract 
law awards expectation damages rather than specific performance, it therefore 
expects less of the promisor than does morality. 
If one distinguishes complaints from obligations, then awarding expectation 
damages has nothing to do with what is required.146 Expectation damages are 
a default measurement of how much the promisee has been wronged. When 
we award expectation damages, we have determined that the promisor has not 
performed and that the promisee now has a complaint. The purpose of private 
law is to recognize and respond to such a complaint. It operates retrospectively. 
So it is a mistake to think that the use of expectation damages instead of specific 
performance says anything about what contract law expects in terms of conduct. 
 
146 There are certain parallels here with the argument offered by Gold, supra note 12:  
The key insight is to see that, even in cases in which there is a remedial duty to perform, 
this does not automatically mean the promisee has a moral right to require performance 
. . . . The important distinction here involves the line between what the promisee has 
a moral right to in terms of remedies and what the promisee has a right to in terms of 
coercing remedies.  
Id. at 1926. Gold’s distinction is between having a right and being able to enforce that right coercively. 
For Gold, what one is entitled to in private law is limited to what one could coercively demand from 
another, which is often less than the other person is morally obligated to do. Id. Thus, even if a 
promisor in breach ought to perform, a promisee may only be entitled to demand an equivalent. Id. 
I am very much in solidarity with Gold’s focus on what the injured party can demand, rather than 
on what the injurer was obligated to do. But I disagree with Gold’s focus on coercive enforcement 
as opposed to remedial moral duties. See id. at 1927 (“Remedial moral rights can differ in content from 
primary moral rights; so too moral enforcement rights can differ in content from remedial moral rights.”). 
Unlike Gold, I am not willing to grant that the remedial moral duty will involve performance. And 
furthermore, it is not clear to me that, absent a state institution like contract law, someone would have 
a right to coercively extract expectation damages; having been wronged does not automatically give a 
person the right to coerce. See Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92 
VA. L. REV. 1391, 1418 (2006) (“Private enforcement is not merely inconvenient: it is inconsistent 
with justice because it is ultimately the rule of the stronger.”); see also ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE 
AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 159-68 (2009) (arguing that rights 
of enforcement cannot exist absent some social contract that gives them content). 
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In ordinary morality, when one fails to perform a promise, one wrongs the 
promisee. For example, if I promise to drive you to work tomorrow and I do 
not show up, then I have done you a wrong and you have a complaint. I owe 
you an apology, and you reasonably may resent my behavior. The magnitude 
in which these responses are appropriate is, at least generally, in proportion 
to the expected benefits that you would have obtained.147 If the promise had 
low stakes and merely forced you to take the bus, I have done you a lesser 
wrong than had you missed a key strategic meeting with very high stakes. That 
is, morality ordinarily measures wrongs done in terms of expectation damages.148 
Moreover, like contract law, substitute performance will be acceptable only if it 
fulfills the substantial purpose of the original agreement. If I send David 
Beckham—of whom you are a big fan and whose company excites you far more 
 
147 Shiffrin mentions, as a divergence from morality, the rule from Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 
156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (L.R. Exch.), which limits damages in contract to those foreseeable at the 
time of contract. Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 1, at 724. The point is that the rule seems to make 
contract law unlike morality in which one is responsible for whatever consequences result from one’s 
wrongdoing. The Hadley rule is troublesome, but on one reading, it fits nicely with the account I am 
offering. Under the Hadley rule, the promisee cannot complain over losses that she ought to have 
disclosed were possible. 156 Eng. Rep. at 151. That is, the rule is another example of a party losing the 
position to complain on the basis of her own failure. For example, in Hadley, the mill (according to 
the court) should have disclosed that it would be shut down without the mill shaft, and could not claim 
consequential damages because it failed to make this disclosure. Id. On the other hand, there may be 
reason to doubt the wisdom of the Hadley rule generally. For a challenge to Hadley’s penalty-default 
analysis, see Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1999). 
148 In responding to Shiffrin, Liam Murphy points out some of the problematic features of 
Shiffrin’s comparison between contract and promise. Liam Murphy, Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 10, 17 (2006). He suggests that the morality of promising is about obligations and does 
not have the remedial aspect that contract law has. Id. I think Murphy is right to think that contract 
law is about remedies rather than obligations. I think he is mistaken, however, when he suggests that 
morality does not provide for guidance in giving out remedies. He writes, “When it comes instead 
to the idea of compensation for breach, I think ethical common sense typically has nothing much to 
say. Or if it does, I think what it tells us is that there would be something a little awkward about 
offering compensation for lost expectancy.” Id. After having initially separated the normative from 
the remedial, Murphy here conceives of compensation in terms of an obligation to do something. 
But the question about compensation is a question about how big of a complaint the injured party 
has. I see no reason why everyday morality cannot provide insight into this question. Surely he is 
right that it would be a bit shady to simply offer money when one breaks a promise. This awkwardness is 
probably attributable to the uncouthness of bringing the dirtiness of cash into a personal interaction. 
It would be much more normal for the person who has broken a promise to offer to do some other 
service in repayment (“Let me make it up to you”), or for the injured person to request some service 
as repayment (“Don’t worry about it, but could you . . .”). But even in personal interactions, money 
may occasionally be appropriate (“Please let me buy you a new one”). More importantly, morality 
does have something to say about the nature of the compensation—in particular about measuring 
the magnitude of the wrong done. “I’m sorry I missed lunch, let me make it up to you by taking you 
out next week,” may be perfectly acceptable, but it is clear that “I’m sorry I missed lunch, let me give 
you this stick of gum to make up for it,” is not. 
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than my own—to give you a ride in my stead, then you might not have any 
complaint because there would be no injury to complain about.149 
That our corrective moral concepts typically operate with expectation damages 
should already begin to refute the suggested divergence with regard to punitive 
damages. Morality makes certain actions right and wrong, but that does not 
mean that it is punitive. Many commentators argue that the absence of punitive 
damages in contract suggests a divergence from morality.150 This, it is argued, 
is because punitive damages are the way to “express the judgment that the 
behavior represents a wrong.”151 
I do not think this is the case. Ordinarily, when morality deems something 
wrong, it demands a corrective response, the severity of which typically depends 
on the lost interests. Our moral emotions and practices of wronging are based 
significantly around the idea of lost interests: I resent you for the time you 
wasted, you forgive me for the hurt I caused, I compensate you for your losses. 
These forms are how morality acknowledges a wrong done—and they are not 
about punishment, but about damaged interests, such as time, pain, and losses. 
Awarding compensatory damages—like apologizing or offering to compensate 
someone—is a way of acknowledging that a wrong was committed. 
What punitive damages add is the idea of punishment. We impose punitive 
damages where we want not merely to recognize a private wrong, but also to 
recognize and discourage a violation of public norms.152 It may be helpful here 
to contrast the private law of contracts with a hypothetical criminal law of 
contracts. The state could make breach of contract illegal and therefore 
punishable—perhaps by fine. In this system, the state would be creating a legal 
norm that made breach of contract legally impermissible. The private law of 
contracts, however, does no such thing, and this is why punitive damages are 
 
149 I say “might” because there are some cases in which you would still have a complaint. First, 
it depends on the purpose of our original agreement. If the ride were really about transportation, 
then David Beckham can potentially advance that purpose better than I could. But if the purpose of 
the ride were something else—for example, you wanted the emotional support of a close friend en 
route to a stressful event—David Beckham might not be a substitute. In short, substitute performance 
must actually be a good substitute. On a related point, substitute performance may not be sufficient 
to avoid a moral complaint when it goes against the trust implicit in our agreement. If I have a habit 
of sending “replacement friends” to our arranged meetings, you may still be damaged by the implicit 
message about the significance I place on our friendship. That is, the disrespect of breach may 
sometimes constitute damage itself. Cf. Markovits, supra note 12, at 1431 (“[The promisor who breaches an 
honest promise] estranges herself from [her promisee], and violates the command that she treat him 
as an end, because she pursues (through her breach) an end in which he cannot possibly share.”). 
150 See, e.g., Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 1, at 722-24. See generally Curtis Bridgeman, Note, 
Corrective Justice in Contract Law: Is There a Case for Punitive Damages?, 56 VAND. L. REV. 237 (2003). 
151 Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 1, at 723. 
152 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation 
in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2075 (1998) (discussing the purpose of punitive damages as “penalizing 
defendants enough ex post that they will undertake optimal precautions ex ante”). 
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inappropriate.153 Contract law is not aimed at providing a state-issued sanction 
against breach. Rather, it is aimed at providing a remedy for those who have 
a particular sort of moral complaint against others. 
Mitigation also does not represent a divergence between contract and promise, 
as long as the concept is viewed as part of corrective morality rather than as 
a normative obligation.154 Contrary to what Shiffrin suggests,155 it does not 
seem that contract law requires promisees to mitigate. Rather, contract law 
merely limits the complaint available to promisees who do not mitigate. A 
complainant-oriented perspective on contract law makes this evident. 
I do not think that contract law is any different from the morality of promises 
regarding mitigation. A promisee who might have avoided the harm that the 
promisor’s breach inflicted cannot complain morally about the harm in the way 
that someone who could not have mitigated the harms might complain. For 
example, if I promise to lend you my car, but then fail to do so, I have wronged 
you more if you had no other recourse. If, however, you could easily have 
borrowed your roommate’s car, but simply did not, you can hardly complain about 
the harm that you received from not having a car (although you might still 
complain about the fact that I broke my promise—and the wasted energy that 
resulted). The magnitude of your complaint, morally speaking, has to do with 
the harm done to your interests and projects. And how much your interests 
and projects are set back depends on the available alternatives. 
This is precisely the view that contract law takes. Contract law does not 
require that a party mitigate damages. Rather, contract law is only willing to 
give damages for the amount that the other party’s interests were set back. 
And this depends on the level of alternatives that are available. When a breach 
occurs, but the other party could easily avoid any losses as a result of the breach, 
the severity of the wrong is rather small—and so too are the damages in contract. 
In sum, I find the basic argument for the view that contract law diverges from 
the morality of promising somewhat perplexing. I agree that contract law does 
not provide norms of permissibility and impermissibility that track morality. 
In fact, it does not seem that it is about norms of permissibility at all. What it is 
about is the remedial task of recognizing and responding to legitimate complaints. 
 
153 I am inclined to think of punitive damages in nonmoral ways. They serve to deter bad behavior, 
and reward those who litigate against practices that hurt others besides themselves. In this sense, punitive 
damages are the one sort of damages that are not based on remedying a wrong done. That is, punitive 
damages are a way to sneak a bit of public or criminal law into the private law system. I suspect this is why 
they often prove so troublesome. 
154 For an argument consistent with the one made in this paragraph, see generally George Letsas 
& Prince Saprai, Mitigation, Fairness and Contract Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT 
LAW 319 (Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014). 
155 Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 1, at 724-26. 
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This is a retrospective notion. Morality also contains a retrospective notion: 
wronging. Contract is based on morality, but on its retrospective components. 
C. The Mistaken Defense 
Even defenders of the view that contract law is based on the morality of 
promising are occasionally misled into viewing the relevant comparison as a 
comparison of norms. Charles Fried’s response to Shiffrin is indicative. Fried 
argues that specific performance is no more the norm in morality than it is in 
contract law.156 Fried rejects a conception of morality that requires perfect 
faithfulness to one’s promises: “This is a conception of morality that I do not 
recognize . . . . Promising is a human institution—albeit a moral one—in which 
human beings invoke mutual trust and mutual respect to accomplish the human 
purposes of one or both of them.”157 For Fried, a promise does not create an 
obligation to perform, but rather an invocation of trust.158 When expectation 
damages are willingly paid, there is no violation of this trust.159 In other words, 
neither contract law nor morality strictly says that you should keep your promise; 
rather, they both say that you should keep your promise or give adequate 
compensation.160 
But this response is problematic, as Fried acknowledges, because one might 
make explicit the stringency of the promise. He writes, 
My argument that expectation damages rather than specific performance is 
the remedy generally required both by the morality of promising and the efficiency 
analysis of contract law loses its force when we consider a contract/promise 
that explicitly provides for specific performance in the event of breach. We do 
not see many such contractual provisions . . . . But what if we have such a clause 
in an ordinary sale-of-goods case? Then I am in trouble.161 
Why is he in trouble? Well, in this case, it seems clear that the promise 
entered into genuinely does demand performance, but courts would still only 
give expectation damages. So, even if Fried is right that ordinary promises 
do not require specific performance, some special promises might. Recall that 
one of Shiffrin’s claims was that morality, unlike contract, allows parties to set 
the stringency of the obligation created.162 
 
156 Charles Fried, The Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 5 (2007). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 See id. (stating that it is “magical thinking” to believe morality demands a seller “doggedly 
keep his bargain”). 
161 Id. at 7 (footnote omitted). 
162 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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This problem reveals the confusion in Fried’s response. Fried, like Shiffrin, 
is thinking of the remedies as translatable into norms of conduct. Shiffrin argued 
that contract law is less demanding than morality. Fried responds by assimilating 
morality to contract law—and morality, it turns out, is not as demanding as 
Shiffrin thought. The trouble arises because there might be a promise that 
explicitly was this demanding, but contract law would still only give expectation 
damages. 
The absurdity of the trouble that Fried gets into is suggestive of confusion. 
Fried mentions that a contract specifying specific performance would be trouble. 
But why? Why would explicitly requiring specific performance change the 
nature of a promise at all? It is as though one might strengthen the promise 
“I promise to do X,” by adding, “And I promise to really perform my promise.” 
If the addition of this clause changes the initial promise, something in the 
account has gone very wrong. 
I have already suggested that I think Fried is correct in thinking that 
expectation damages are the remedy in morality. So where does Fried go wrong? 
He goes wrong by assuming that the remedial question corresponds to the 
strength of the obligation. As a result, he thinks that one might change to another 
sort of remedy (i.e., specific performance) by making a different sort of promise 
(i.e., a stronger one). But this is not the case. If expectation damages are the 
remedy in morality as well as contract law, then if one says, “I promise to do 
X and I promise to give specific performance,” one would owe expectation damages 
for the second of these promises no less than for the first. If broken promises 
get expectation damages, then there is no reason that a broken promise to perform 
should be any different. As Shiffrin puts it, “I doubt that one may alter by 
declaration or by agreement the moral significance of a broken promise.”163 
But when Fried says that morality has expectation damages, he means 
something very different than I do. Fried means that the moral obligation created 
by a promise is more conditional than the obligation of faithful performance. 
I do not mean this at all. What I mean is that when we fail to faithfully perform, 
the ordinary measure of how great a wrong we have committed is based on 
lost expectations.164 And this is completely compatible with the claim that 
 
163 Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 1, at 729. Because I think this is right, I take it to refute 
Shiffrin’s claim that morality allows parties to set the stringency of commitment. We can make 
different promises (as I think “I promise to come if I can” is different from “I promise to come no 
matter what”) but we cannot alter by declaration the moral significance of the same broken promise. 
164 T.M. Scanlon writes, 
If one fails to fulfill a promise, one should compensate the promisee if one can, but 
the obligation one undertakes when one makes a promise is an obligation to do the 
thing promised, not simply to do it or compensate the promisee accordingly . . . . The 
central concern of the morality of promises is therefore with the obligation to perform; 
the idea of compensation is of at most secondary interest. 
1172 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 1131 
morality requires faithful performance. In this sense, my understanding of 
the morality of promises is closer to Shiffrin’s than to Fried’s. I agree with 
Shiffrin that the morality of promising requires that we perform our promises 
(as opposed to requiring that we either perform or pay up). 
D. Corrective Justice and Civil Recourse 
I want to offer some brief and general remarks about how the view that I 
have been describing may relate to existing theories about private law. Two 
competing conceptions of private law—corrective justice theories and civil 
recourse theories—both, in different ways, view private law as related to morality 
and as inherently ex post. The interpretation of contract law that I am suggesting 
has important similarities with both these views, especially civil recourse theory. 
Ultimately, however, I think that the interpretation of contract law that I have 
sketched is more radically ex post and thus represents a position even further 
along the spectrum of available views. 
I have been suggesting that contract law reflects a retrospective aspect of 
morality. I take this to be harmonious with Ernest Weinrib’s claim that private 
law is “the locus of a special morality that has its own structure and its own 
repertoire of arguments.”165 I believe that private law is very much the locus 
of a retrospective and remedial morality. In this basic sense, my view is in 
solidarity with corrective justice theories. Corrective justice theorists view the 
private law as ex post in the sense that its obligations are based on the moral 
relationships that arise once a transgression has occurred. The focus is on 
second-order obligations of repair rather than first-order duties of conduct.166 
Corrective justice theorists, however, do not draw the distinction between 
obligation and complaint that I have emphasized. In fact, the corrective 
justice approach is painstakingly built around the idea that legal remedies 
correspond with moral obligations. It is a hallmark of the corrective justice 
approach that the imposition of liability is the fulfillment of what is owed.167 
 
Scanlon, supra note 17, at 92. I agree with the first sentence wholeheartedly, but I must respectfully 
disagree with the second. The idea of compensation—that is, the remedial moral notion—is significant in 
its own right. It is, I have argued, the basis for contract law. 
165 ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 2 (1995). I fear, however, that Weinrib 
himself fails to appreciate fully the way in which this morality is “special.” By intimately linking the 
nature of an obligation with the wrong committed, Weinrib does not recognize the distinctly ex post 
perspective of private law and the morality with which it connects. 
166 See, e.g., id. at 63 (“[C]orrective justice requires the actor to restore to the victim the amount 
representing the actor’s self-enrichment at the victim’s expense.”); Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and 
the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349, 365 (1992) (“Corrective justice requires annulling 
wrongful gains and losses.”). 
167 See, e.g., RIPSTEIN, supra note 146, at 82 (“What is hindered . . . is not wrongful action but 
its impact on the external freedom of others . . . . So, for example, if I injure you or damage your 
property, you are entitled to compensation. You must be made whole, so that the embodiments of 
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The distinction that I have drawn maintains that, even if an obligation is owed, 
the imposition of liability may not be appropriate. Liability is viewed as something 
other than the enforcement of a moral obligation. 
In this regard, my account is more in line with civil recourse theories of 
private law. In contrast with the corrective justice theories, civil recourse theories 
maintain that liability is not the enforcement of remedial moral obligations.168 
Instead, private law consists in the legal power to seek redress when first-order 
obligations have been violated.169 Private law is viewed as ex post in the sense 
that it consists of legal powers that arise after a wrong has been committed. This 
approach, like mine, severs the tight connection between legal liability and 
the enforcement of a moral obligation. 
In one way, I believe that the account that I have offered might be read as 
compatible with a civil recourse theory of private law. In particular, the 
requirement that a party be in a position to complain might be interpreted as 
parallel to what civil recourse theorists have described as “a substantive standing 
requirement.”170 My argument has been that one precondition for making a 
valid complaint is having the standing to complain about the relevant wrongdoing, 
which can be lost by virtue of a party’s own misconduct. Thus, certain defenses 
in contract law that focus on the misconduct of the complaining party can be 
interpreted as challenges to the standing of the complaining party. In addition 
to the substantive requirement that a complaining party have suffered a violation 
of a right, there is a further substantive requirement that a victim be in a position 
to complain against such a violation. 
In a deeper way, however, the account that I have sketched is at odds with 
civil recourse theory. Like the corrective justice theorist, the civil recourse 
theorist views private law as involving first-order legal obligations.171 According 
 
your external freedom are as they would have been had I not wronged you. The same applies if I fail 
to honor a contract I have made with you. You are entitled to be put in the position you would have 
been in had my choice—itself an embodiment of your freedom because I transferred it to you—been 
exercised as I was obligated to do.”). 
168 See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 139, at 755 (“The courts in tort law do not stand 
ready to facilitate the rectification of wrongdoing, or to restore a normative equilibrium, as corrective 
justice theorists maintain. Instead, they empower individuals to obtain an avenue of recourse against 
other private parties.”). 
169 Id. 
170 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 957-60 
(2010); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Substantive Standing, Civil Recourse, and Corrective Justice, 39 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 299, 304-07 (2011) [hereinafter Zipursky, Substantive Standing]. By “substantive standing,” 
the corrective justice theorist means that one of the plaintiff ’s rights was violated. Of course, this 
understanding of substantive standing is very different from the sense of standing that I have described. 
But the general idea that private law involves a right of action preconditioned on a standing to complain 
is the same. 
171 See generally John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 
U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998). 
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to the civil recourse theorist, there is a tort law duty of care and a contract law 
duty to fulfill one’s contract.172 An important aspect of the civil recourse approach 
is to view the power to seek redress as necessarily connected with the violation of 
a first-order obligation that is owed to the person seeking redress.173 As a result, 
decoupling first-order obligations and the complaints based upon them, as I have 
suggested, is at odds with even civil recourse theories. 
Unlike the civil recourse theories, I have suggested that there are no first-order 
legal obligations in contract law. Contract law does not include an obligation 
to fulfill one’s side of an agreement. Such questions of permissibility are simply 
not part of its scope. It is essential to the civil recourse theory to hold otherwise, 
because for it, the violation of a first-order duty that is owed to a particular 
individual is what gives that individual standing to bring a legal action.174 A 
person is in a position to complain if and only if a duty owed to her is violated. 
The first-order obligations and the standing to complain are flipsides of the same 
coin. But detaching obligation and complaint in the way that I have suggested 
calls this picture into question. 
For these reasons, the picture of contract law described here presses further 
than do corrective justice and civil recourse theories. Corrective justice theory 
correctly emphasizes the ex post and remedial side of morality. Civil recourse 
theory correctly shifts the focus from the obligation of the wrongdoer to the 
legal claims of aggrieved party. But this shift does not go far enough in detaching 
the question whether a party has a complaint from whether a first-order legal 
 
172 See generally id. 
173 This feature of civil recourse theory is the basis for a convincing criticism offered by Arthur 
Ripstein. Ripstein argues that civil recourse faces a dilemma: either the recourse available is shaped 
by the nature of the obligation that gives rise to the action, in which case the theory collapses into 
corrective justice, or the recourse is not shaped by the obligation, in which case the theory defends 
mere revenge or instrumentalism. See Arthur Ripstein, Civil Recourse and Separation of Wrongs and 
Remedies, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 163, 203 (2011) (“With respect to what we might call the narrow 
principle of civil recourse, according to which plaintiff has a power to enforce a right, civil recourse 
is not merely consistent with, but required by, corrective justice . . . . [T]he attempt to distinguish 
a more ambitious idea of civil recourse, understood as domesticated anger and retaliation, must fail. 
Not only does it fail to integrate with the relational nature of duty; it also falls into the very sort of 
functionalist instrumentalism that pragmatic conceptualism sought to leave behind.”). I agree that, 
once one accepts that private law includes a system of first-order relational duties, then it is hard 
not to slide into a corrective justice view. My view avoids this criticism because, unlike the civil 
recourse theory, it does not accept the connection between first-order obligations and wrongs. In responding 
to the civil recourse theorists, Ripstein remarks that “the . . . equation of having a duty with the prospect 
of direct enforcement by a public authority leads ineluctably to the conclusion that tort law does not 
include duties of non-injury, as a public authority does not directly enforce them either.” Id. at 201. In 
a very rough sense, my view accepts this horn of Ripstein’s dilemma. 
174 See Zipursky, Substantive Standing, supra note 170, at 306 (“Substantive standing rules say that a 
right of action for P in a certain tort T against D is dependent upon D’s having done the tort T upon 
P in the manner enjoined by the relational directive corresponding to the tort T; that P has a right 
of action for T against D only if P was among those upon whom D was enjoined not to commit T, and 
D did commit T upon P.”). 
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obligation was violated.175 Only once the distinction is fully drawn is the 
connection between private law and morality properly appreciated. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that an important distinction exists between the ex ante realm 
of obligations and the ex post realm of complaints. This distinction is evident 
in situations where one party loses her standing to complain, even if an obligation 
may have been violated. And I have argued that, once this distinction is recognized, 
it is clear that contract law is concerned with complaints. 
What this means is that contract law does not actually impose obligations. 
In a way, then, the theory of efficient breach turns out to be partially correct. 
Contract law does not offer a norm against breach of contract. This is not—as 
the theory of efficient breach would suggest—because contract law judges breach 
of contract permissible when the costs are high enough. Contract law simply 
does not determine permissibility. If it did, it would be like the criminal law, 
imposing general permissions and prohibitions. But it is not. 
It is instead a form of private law with one party asserting a complaint against 
another. Indeed, it begins with a filing that is called a “complaint.” And the 
question with which contract law concerns itself is whether that complaint is valid 
against the other party. This process is intrinsically ex post and intrinsically 
about justice as between the two parties. 
It is a mistake to think that contract deems breach to be legally impermissible, 
but it is also a mistake to think that contract law considers breach to be legally 
permissible. Contract law is about recognizing and responding to, in a legal 
way, the complaints that breach can produce. Such complaints are a familiar 
part of everyday morality. If this is right, then contract law is based on the morality 
of promises after all. But it is not directly based on the moral obligations that 
promises create—rather, it is based on our response to promissory wrongs. 
 
175 Another way to put the difference is as follows: civil recourse theories attempt to draw a 
distinction between wrongs and remedies, but they accept the corrective justice account of the 
connection between duty and wrongs. My view draws the important distinction between duties and 
wrongs, not between wrongs and remedies. 
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